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Digital Property:
The Ultimate Boundary?*
Brian F. Fitzgerald**
INTRODUCTION
In a world where information is increasingly relevant to our
social, cultural and economic existence it is vitally important to un-
derstand the legal boundary of digital property.' To this end this
article presents a preliminary framework for understanding the
* This article was given impetus by an invitation to deliver a Special
Lecture at the University of Western Ontario Law School in London Ontario,
Canada in October 2000. It was further developed through Spring 2001 while
teaching at Santa Clara University Law School and was further refined through a
conference presentation at Roger Williams University School of Law, Bristol,
Rhode Island, in April 2001. I owe thanks to David Rice, Mark Perry, Margaret
Ann Wilkinson, Richard Gold, Nicholas Pengelley, Michael Lehmann and Anne
Fitzgerald.
** Brian Fitzgerald is a Professor and Head of the School of Law and Justice
at Southern Cross University in New South Wales, Australia. He is co-editor of
one of Australia's leading texts on e-commerce and has published articles on Law
and the Internet, Technology Law and Intellectual Property Law in Australia, the
United States, Europe and Japan. Over the past two years, Brian has delivered
seminars on information technology and intellectual property law in Australia,
New Zealand, China, the United States, Canada, Norway and The Netherlands.
1. See generally Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strate-
gic Guide to the Network Economy 2 (1999) (explaining strategies for success in
network economy); Lester C. Thurow, Building Wealth: New Rules for Individuals,
Companies and Nations in a Knowledge-Based Economy 116-25 (Harper Business
ed., 2000) (explaining the importance of intellectual property to modern company's
success or failure); Frank Webster, Theories of the Information Society (John Urry
ed., 1995) (announcing the predominance of information in modern societies); Ber-
nadette E. Lynn, Intellectual Capital: Unearthing Hidden Value by Managing In-
tellectual Assets, Ivey Bus. J., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 48 (recognizing the importance of
Intellectual Capital); see also Don Tapscott et al., Digital Capital: Harnessing the
Power of Business Webs (2000) (discussing the business models used to create
wealth in the digital economy); Stephan Bernhut, Measuring the Value of Intellec-
tual Capital, Ivey Bus. J., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 16 (pointing out the vital importance
of intellectual capital in the new economy).
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process through which digital property is being constructed. 2 It
aims to highlight through select and recent cases the constitu-
tional, legislative, contractual and technological dimensions of dig-
ital property.3
I. THE CONSTITuTIoNAL MANDATE: THE ENUMERATED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP) POWER
In Australia, Canada and the United States of America, the
federal or national legislature is given significant power in their
respective federating Constitutions to enact laws with respect to
intellectual property. While not all "digital property" comes within
the constitutional definition of intellectual property4 (as you will
see below), these constitutional sources of the key type of informa-
tion property, namely, intellectual property (IP), are an obvious
and necessary place to begin this analysis. The constitutional pro-
visions are expressed as follows:
Australia
Section 51 (xviii) of the Constitution provides that the Com-
monwealth Parliament may make laws for the peace, order and
good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: "Copy-
rights, patents of inventions and designs, and trade marks."
Canada
Pursuant to sections 91 (22) and 91 (23) of the Constitution
Act, 1867, the Canadian Parliament has exclusive power to legis-
late in respect of "Patents of Invention and Discovery" and "Copy-
2. See Brian F. Fitzgerald, A Legal Framework for Understanding Informa-
tional Property Entitlements in the Digital Environment, at http://
www.innovationlaw.org/lawforum/pages/lectureseries.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2001).
3. Brian F. Fitzgerald, Intellectual Capital and Law in the Digital Environ-
ment, Ivey Bus. J., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 22.
4. See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (defining intellectual property rights).
A large amount of intellectual property legislation is derived from international
conventions/treaties, with the TRIPS agreement being a current and concise sum-
mary of those international principles.
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rights." Trademarks are covered by the trade and commerce
power.5
United States
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution
empowers the Congress to legislate: "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." Trademarks are covered by the Commerce Clause. 6
Immediately upon reading these provisions one is drawn to
comment that the U.S. provision is written in a more flowery and
prosaic language, perhaps representing the style of constitutional
drafting of an earlier era or one consequent to a revolution. The
U.S. provision appears to be much more explicitly guided by a pur-
pose for granting intellectual property rights-to promote the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts by securing exclusive rights for
limited times-than are the Australian or Canadian provisions.
The crucial issue that has arisen in relation to these sources or
fonts of intellectual property is the extent to which they empower
governments to propertize information. Are there any limits? Is it
possible to create rights in information that last in perpetuity?
Different types of limits are asserted, such as:
the purpose for which the IP right is granted/public domain
user rights;
type of information that the constitution will allow to be
propertized;
length of time a property right will endure;
medium in which the information exists, e.g., fixed in a tangi-
ble form.
The follow up question that has arisen is whether these limits,
if they exist, may be undermined or overridden by other constitu-
tional clauses bestowing legislative power at the federal level or by
state laws.7 For example, can the Commerce Clause in the United
States or the trade and commerce clause in Australia be used to
5. See McDonald v. Vapor Can. Ltd., [19771 2 S.C.R. 134 (Can.).
6. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-95 (1879).
7. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546 (1973); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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legislate informational property rights that surpass any constitu-
tional limits inherent in the respective IP clauses?8 Or will the IP
clause be read like the unjust acquisition (or takings) clause of the
Australian Constitution so as to limit the other enumerated fed-
eral legislative powers?9
A. The Rationale and Purpose of IP Rights-The Scope of the
Public Domain
A preliminary question and one that is central to the debate
over propertizing information is the role and purpose of intellec-
tual property law or, if looked at from another perspective, the
scope of public domain rights.' 0 Fisher explains that there are (at
8. See Brian F. Fitzgerald, (Australian) Constitutional Limits on Intellectual
Property, 23 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 103 (2001).
9. See Austl. Const. ch. I, pt. V, § 51, cl. xxxi. The Australian Constitution,
amongst other things, divides the legislative powers of the Australian federal sys-
tem between the Commonwealth (central) and State (regional) governments. Sec-
tion 51 of the Constitution provides that the Commonwealth Parliament shall
have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Com-
monwealth with respect to an enumerated list of powers. As a general rule the
empowering clauses of section 51 are seen as independent sources for legislative
action, although section 51 (xxxi) is a clear exception to that rule. Section 51 (xxxi)
confers a power on the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate with respect to "the
acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in
respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws." The provision operates,
firstly, to give the Commonwealth power to acquire property and, secondly, as an
individual right or guarantee to private property protected by "just terms." See
Georgiadis v. AOTC (1994) 179 C.L.R. 297 (Austl.); Mutual Pools & Staff Ltd. v.
Commonwealth (1994) 179 C.L.R. 155 (Austl.). In acting as a guarantee, the
clause is said to remove from other clauses the power to compulsorily acquire prop-
erty. However, if another clause in section 51 displays, by words or content, an
intention to allow acquisition without just terms or if the acquisition is of a type
that is not susceptible to just terms, the guarantee is not operative. Therefore
statutes imposing taxation, penalties by way of forfeiture of property or a bank-
ruptcy scheme are not seen as infringing the guarantee of or right to private prop-
erty protected by section 51 (xxxi). See Mutual Pools, 179 C.L.R. at 169-71, 177-81,
186-89, 219-22; see also Health Ins. Comm'n v. Peverill (1994) 179 C.L.R. 226
(Austl.); Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 C.L.R. 513
(Austl.).
10. See generally Yocahi Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354
(1999) (including in the definition of the public domain works protected by copy-
right but that may be used without the permission of the copyright owner under
privileges such as the fair use doctrine); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
Emory L.J. 965 (1990) (defining the public domain as the realm unprotected by
copyright).
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least) four (imperfect yet useful) overarching theories of intellec-
tual property.11
Economiclutilitarian theory: intellectual property law is justi-
fied in terms of economic efficiency. 12
Lockean/labor desert: intellectual property rights are natural
rights earned through adding labor to the common resource of
information with the proviso that enough and as good is left
for others. 13
Personhood: intellectual property is an emanation of the per-
son and the law should facilitate this personal aspect. 14
Social planning: intellectual property law should be designed
to culturally enrich democratic society. 15
Economic Rights
Arguably, the guiding premise of American copyright and pat-
ent law is the utilitarian ethic that legal protection of intellectual
property is needed to advance public welfare because it fosters cre-
ative genius/product, which can in turn be distributed for the good
11. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in New Essays in the
Legal and Political Theory of Property, 169-73 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); see
also Anne Fitzgerald, Intellectual Property 7-9 (Law Book Co., Sydney 1999); Rob-
ert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 1-21 (2d
ed. 2000); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287,
288-89 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
429-32 (1984); Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 218, 252-53 (K.B. 1769); Adam
Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 83 (Ronald L. Meek et al. eds., Liberty Classics
1982) (1762); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325 (1989); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996).
13. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N.
GAOR 3d Sess., pt. 1, at art. 27(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 A (III) (1948) (stating
"[elveryone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests re-
sulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the au-
thor."); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533
(1993).
14. See generally Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L.
Rev. 957 (1982) (exploring the relationship between property and personhood).
15. See generally Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamor-
phoses of "Authorship", 1991 Duke L.J. 455 (1991); The Construction of Author-
ship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature (Martha Woodmansee & Peter
Jaszi eds., 1994) (discussing the relationship between copyright and literary and
artistic culture).
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of the general public.16 In the words of the United States Supreme
Court in Mazer v. Stein:17
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Con-
gress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encour-
agement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inven-
tors in 'Science and useful Arts.'"18
This economic conception of intellectual property is reinforced
by the copyright and patent statutes, which bestow rights upon the
IP owner to control the economic exploitation of the work or prod-
uct. The intellectual property law of the United Kingdom, Canada
and Australia has exhibited a similar utilitarian economic basis. 19
As well, in these systems the IP owner holds economic rights to
exploit the information, e.g., the exclusive right of the copyright
owner to control reproduction.
Lockean Natural Rights
The view that a person possesses a natural right to own what
they have created through their labour is also very influential in
many intellectual property systems throughout the world. 20 In
more recent times, though, copyright claims to own information on
the basis of labour have not been accepted in the United States or
Canada per se, although a recent decision in Australia was more
receptive to such claims.21 If copyright is to be the vehicle for the
claim to own the value of adding one's labour to the common stock
of information in the United States and Canada, then the labour
must produce an intellectual product. Otherwise mere "sweat of
the brow" claims in those countries will need to be asserted under
16. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway 165-96 (1994).
17. 347 U.S. 201 (1953).
18. Id. at 219.
19. See Welcome Real-Time SA v. Catuity Inc. [20011 F.C.A. 445 at para. 129
(Austl.); David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 6-13 (1997); David Fewer, Consti-
tutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the Limits of Copyright in Ca-
nada, 55 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 175, 187-93 (1997).
20. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 17, at
para. 2 ("Intellectual property shall be protected."); Fewer, supra note 19, at 187-
89, 191-93 (discussing the application of this theory to Canadian intellectual prop-
erty law).
21. See Telstra Corp. v. Desktop Marketing Sys. Pty. Ltd. [20011 F.C.A. 612
(Austl.).
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sui generis law like the emerging European database laws, unfair
competition law22 or unjust enrichment law.23
Moral Rights
In contrast to the Anglo-American approach, the intellectual
property law of continental Europe (especially copyright law) has
long recognised both an economic and personal aspect to intellec-
tual property rights. 24 The personal aspect which is encompassed
by the third category of theories in Fisher's taxonomy is known as
a moral right.25
Moral rights are personal rights belonging to authors or cre-
ators of copyright material and exist quite independently from eco-
nomic rights. They continue to exist even after the economic rights
have been transferred. The principal moral rights are:
The right of attribution, that is the right of the creator of a
work to be publicly identified as such and to prevent others
22. See generally Intl News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)
(discussing unfair competition law); Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105
F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (ruling professional basketball games were not "original
works of authorship" protected by Copyright Act); Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v.
Dow Jones, 456 N.E. 2d 84 (Ill. 1983) (ruling publisher's stock market indexes and
averages could not be used by board of trade as the basis for its proposed stock
index futures contracts without the consent of the publisher); Wendy J. Gordon,
On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and a Restitutionary Impulse, 78
Va. L. Rev. 149, 281 (1992) (suggesting that "the judicial experience in the allied
area of restitution has suggested that economic and other norms should, and do,
condition the implementation of the impulse to grant reward for labor expended");
J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
Vand. L. Rev. 51, 56 (1997) (proposing "either the use of unfair competition princi-
ples to protect database contents, or the adoption of an intellectual property re-
gime based on more refined liability principles, rather than on exclusive property
rights, that would reconcile the need for legal incentives to invest with a calculus
of net social benefits").
23. See Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1946); Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 30 N.E. 506 (N.Y. 1892);
Brian F. Fitzgerald & Leif Gamertsfelder, Protecting Informational Products (In-
cluding Databases) Through Unjust Enrichment Law: An Australian Perspective,
20 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 244 (1998).
24. See Joined Cases C-241-242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann and Indep. Televi-
sion Publ'ns Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, at para. 71, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718
(1995) (explaining "The Court of First Instance is right . . . in stating that the
essential function of copyright is to protect the moral rights in the work and ensure
a reward for creative effort"); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 15; see generally Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 252-53; Gerald Dworkin, Moral
Rights and the Common Law Countries, 5 Austl. Intell. Prop. L.J. 5 (1994).
25. Fisher, supra note 11.
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from claiming authorship of the work, to prevent others from
wrongfully attributing to an author works that are not his or
hers or that are unauthorised altered versions of his or her
work; and
The right of integrity, that is the right to object to distortions
or derogatory distortions of a work.26
The obligation to afford moral rights to creators of copyright
materials arises from Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, which
provides that:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have
the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to
any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
other derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the
preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be main-
tained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights,
and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions
authorised by the legislation of the country where protec-
tion is claimed. However, those countries whose legisla-
tion, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to
this Act, does not provide for the protection after the
death of the author of all the rights set out in the preced-
ing paragraph may provide that some of these rights may,
after his death, cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted
by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the
country where protection is claimed.
Until recently, Australian law provided only minimal and indi-
rect recognition for moral rights, notwithstanding Article 6bis of
the Berne Convention. The recognition of moral rights under the
Copyright Act, 1968, was limited to a duty not to falsely attribute
the authorship of a work, a duty not to falsely attribute the author-
ship of an altered work and a duty not to falsely attribute the au-
thorship of a reproduction of an artistic work. The Copyright
Amendment (Moral Rights) Act, 2000, which entered into force on
December 21, 2000, introduces the moral rights of integrity and
26. Brian F. Fitzgerald & Anne Fitzgerald, Cyberlaw: Cases and Materials on
the Internet, Digital Intellectual Property and Electronic Commerce 336 (Prospect
Media, Sydney 2002).
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attribution of authorship and strengthens the earlier prohibition
on false attribution of authorship. Under the new Australian law,
moral rights are not infringed by acts to which the creator has con-
sented, providing the consent is in writing and meets certain other
conditions.
Interestingly, Canada introduced moral rights in the Copy-
right Act of 1931; however, scope for waiver has meant that a cul-
ture of moral rights has not been prominent in Canadian copyright
law. 27 The United States has legislated for some very limited ap-
plications of moral rights,28 however many American academics
are wary of the potential of moral rights to lock up information and
inhibit free speech, especially in the context of the Internet.29
Culturally Enriching Rights
In a world where digitized information (and its control/owner-
ship) is of continuing and increasing significance to the economy,
society and culture, we have seen renewed relevance for and inter-
est in Fisher's fourth category of IP theory: social planning or cul-
tural enhancement theory. Every significant claim over digital
value at issue at the moment can be described as one involving a
battle between utilitarian or Lockean/natural rights claims to own-
ership versus the creation of intellectual property rights for rea-
sons of cultural enhancement. In the digital environment of an
information society, where "information is lifeblood," the cultural
aspects of intellectual property are brought into focus. The
decentering of the author as creator is part of this phenomenon,
but more so the realisation that an expressive work is a collection
of culturally imbued facts. As we shall see below, in the United
States, the power of the First Amendment is being employed to
attack the "private property" imperialism of the IP statutes over
information and to thereby assist the case of the culture theorists.
27. See Vaver, supra note 19, at 87-96.
28. See generally Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994 & Supp. IV
1998) (granting rights of attribution and integrity to certain authors of visual art);
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995) (summarizing the scope
of moral rights in the law of the United States).
29. See generally William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet,
73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1203 (1998) (suggesting moral rights should have more lim-
ited application in the eclectic transnational and digitized world of the Internet).
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If we live in an information based economy, culture and soci-
ety, the process of propertizing information 30 must be seen as be-
ing inherently concerned with the way we live, think, communicate
and construct knowledge. This takes us far beyond questions of
economics to key cultural and social issues, which the process of
propertizing information must now accommodate. For instance, it
is no longer good enough to allocate property rights in software
without considering the social and cultural implications of the
market power and monopoly of thought that such a process will
engender. Software is not just code, it is discourse, in that it allows
us to see and say things in digital space. 3 '
Free software and open code software projects, in some in-
stances, epitomize a cultural rationale for intellectual property
rights.3 2 In the classic free software scenario embodied in the
30. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 814-17 (1935); see, e.g., E. Richard Gold, Body
Parts: Proprietary Rights and the Ownership of Human Biological Materials (Geo.
Univ. Press 1996); Ejan Mackaay, The Economics of Emergent Property Rights on
the Internet, in The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment 13 (P. Bernt
Hugenholtz ed., 1996) (stating that although traditional property fencing tech-
niques do not work well on the Internet, property is by no means dead, because of
the initiatives exploring alternative fencing and new extensions of property
rights); Thomas A. Stewart, Intellectual Capital: The New Wealth of Organiza-
tions (Bantam Doubleday Dell 1997); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish? Eco-
nomic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 Vand. L.
Rev. 2007 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 Vand. L.
Rev. 1799 (2000); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in
the Transition From Marx to Markets, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1998) (discussing the
dangers of anticommons property, specifically the under use of resources and the
lack of effective privileges to use); David Lange, Recognizing The Public Domain,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1981, at 147; Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl,
Licensing Information in the Global Information Market: Freedom of Contract
Meets Public Policy, 21 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 387 (1999); Lester C. Thurow,
Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct.
1997, at 95; Hal R. Varian, Versioning Information Goods (Mar. 13, 1997) (discuss-
ing differential pricing known as quality discrimination or versioning), at httpi/
www.sims.berkeley.edu/-hal/people/hal/papers.html.
31. See Brian F. Fitzgerald, Software as Discourse: The Power of Intellectual
Property in Digital Architecture, 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 337 (2000).
32. See Marcus Maher, Open Source Software: The Success of an Alternative
Intellectual Property Incentive Paradigm, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent,
L.J. 619 (2000) (showing how the science of complexity theory is able to explain the
open source movement's ability to translate non-economic incentive mechanisms
into a process for technological development and innovation); David McGowan, Le-
gal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Stephen M.
McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 25 (2000) (conclud-
ing that open source software may have a greater effect on the law of developing
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GNU General Public Licence (GPL), code is distributed in a man-
ner that is open and free (not free as in beer but free as in speech),
allowing software developers further down the line to modify and
improve upon the initial software product. The initial distributor
of the code controls its presentation and further dissemination
through copyright and contract law (contractual software license).
In general, subsequent users and modifiers are required to further
distribute the code they received and to make code of any deriva-
tive work available to the public. In this process, copyright law is
used to create a "copyleft" effect as opposed to a "copyright" effect
by mandating that code should be open and free for all to use in the
innovation and development of software. In doing so, copyright
law is used to structure the practices of software developers into a
community of effort, while in a broader sense ensuring diversity
and social innovation of the digital environment and, thereby, so-
cial existence. In short, free software and open code projects have
the potential to use intellectual property law (copyright) to enrich
and to better structure cultural existence. Not every developer or
all projects under these banners will be minded to act in a cultur-
ally benevolent manner-some will do it for the purpose of building
a reputation that can later be exploited for monetary rewards and
others will increasingly use open code to augment already thriving
proprietary business models. 33
Two difficult issues remain to be considered in relation to the
culture theory. Firstly, how does it relate to the first theory con-
sidered, which is primarily focused on public welfare in an eco-
nomic sense? There can be little doubt that both theory one and
four are concerned with public welfare, but in different ways. The-
ory one proposes to reward the author in the name of public wel-
fare, but the benefit to community or culture becomes a
technologies than the law will have on software practices); David Bollier, The
Power of Openness: Why Citizens, Education, Government and Business Should
Care About the Coming Revolution in Open Source Code Software, available at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/opencode/h2o/#intro (last visited Oct. 27, 2001) (illus-
trating the broad effect of changes in open code software); www.gnu.org;
www.opensource.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
33. See generally Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, available
at http://www.tuxedo.org/-esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/in-
dex.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2001) (discussing the evolution of Linux in the com-
mercial world).
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"presumed" consequence of the creative activity.34 Theory four is
the reverse in that it starts out with the community or culture and
seeks to explain when it is beneficial for a creator to become a
property holder. In this equation, economic efficiency may be con-
sidered but is by no means a totalising criterion or rationale.35
The conclusion must be that both seek to prosper from public wel-
fare but from completely different ends of the spectrum.
Secondly, claims for protection of indigenous cultural materi-
als are also subject to increasing attention. These might be seen as
claims to collective or group moral rights or, more broadly, as
claims that IP law should be used to respect and enhance cultural
tradition and spirituality.36 A concern is that granting perpetual
rights to control information that has special cultural significance
to indigenous peoples locks up information in a society where ac-
cess to and use of information should be optimised. Another con-
cern is that if indigenous peoples can be allowed to claim the
special cultural significance of information, then a way will be
opened for non-indigenous people to make similar claims in respect
of other (religious or social) information culturally significant to
them. These responses understate the richness of indigenous cul-
ture and its plight in the face of unethical economic exploitation.
Proprietary Purpose: A Limiting Factor
Whether intellectual property rights are designed to reward
people, or to reduce transaction costs and increase allocative effi-
ciency, or for reasons of rewarding the fruits of labour, or per-
sonhood theories or cultural development, the question remains
whether any purpose or rationale for such rights acts as a limit on
what rights can be legislated.
34. See Benkler, supra note 10; Boyle, supra note 30; Julie E. Cohen, supra
note 30 (criticising the presumption that Intellectual Property law is always eco-
nomically and culturally beneficial).
35. It is interesting to contemplate how a cultural approach to IP might be
reconciled with the permitted exceptions stipulated under TRIPS, arts. 13, 17, 30.
36. Maroochy Barambah & Ade Kukoyi, Protocols for the Use of Indigenous
Cultural Material, in Going Digital 2000: Legal Issues for E-Commerce Software
and the Internet 133 (Prospect Publishing Sydney ed., 2000); Terri Janke, Our
Culture Our Future: A Report on Australian Indigenous Cultural Intellectual
Property Rights, 43-48 (1988) (stating indigenous people's desires for protection of
indigenous cultural and intellectual property); United Nations Draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 29 (1993).
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There is sufficient United States Supreme Court jurispru-
dence to suggest that copyright or patent legislation should stimu-
late economic efficiency. But in light of the recent decision in
Eldred v. Reno,37 it might be doubted whether a United States
court would use this as the basis for any general decision limiting
the power of Congress to legislate. If anything, such a rationale for
the IP clause would most likely be implemented through interpre-
tation of the various elements of the clause. Notions of per-
sonhood 38  or cultural enhancement do not seem to be
constitutionally required or entrenched. However, the following
statement from Graham v. John Deere Co, 39 read at its broadest,
suggests that there may be a broader purposive limit which, with
some imagination, could embrace notions of social impact:
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not
overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional
purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without re-
gard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained
thereby.40
In Australia and Canada it is doubtful whether any general
limit based on notions of economy, personhood or culture would be
operational. Once again, if any limits exist they must be found in
the specific elements of the respective constitutional clauses. Al-
though, the recent statement by Judge Kirby of the High Court of
Australia in Grain Pool of WA v. The Commonwealth4' suggests
democratic and cultural considerations may be relevant to inter-
preting the scope of legislative power on this issue:
No absolute or unlimited rule may be stated. The protection
of intellectual property rights must be afforded in a constitu-
37. 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In Eldred, the majority held that the per-
ambulatory words of the United States Copyright and Patent Clause-to promote
progress of science and the useful arts-are not to be read as limits on the legisla-
tive power of Congress. This suggests that the purpose for bestowing the legisla-
tive power becomes relevant if at all in relation to the operative parts or terms of
the clause.
38. See Gilliam v. ABC Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). These issues can be
relevant if related to the economic incentive argument.
39. 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
40. Id.; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 230 (quoting Kendall v.
Winsor, 21 How. 322, 328 (1859)) ("[TIn rewarding useful invention, the 'rights and
welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.'").
41. [2000] H.C.A. 14, available at http//www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/
hight/2000/14.html.
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tional setting which upholds other values of public good in a
representative democracy. In the United States the relevant
head of constitutional power has been viewed as containing
in-built limitations many of which are derived from the com-
peting constitutional objective of public access to information:
Graham v. John Deere Co.; Feist Publications, Inc v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., Inc. In Australia, the constitutional
setting is different but the existence of competing constitu-
tional objectives, express and implied, is undoubted. 42.
Having considered the difficulty courts have with invoking a
broad notion of purpose for granting IP rights as an enforceable
restraint on legislation, the more interesting question is to deter-
mine the specific limits that arise from the elements of the clauses.
B. The Type of Information That the Constitution Will Allow to
be Propertized
Central to the presentation of digitised information is
software. Software has been protected as a literary work under the
U.S. Copyright Act since 1980 and under the Australian Copyright
Act since 1984. Article 10 (1) of the TRIPs agreement also provides
that software shall be protected as a literary text in copyright
law.43 More recently, software has been subject to a vast amount
of patenting throughout the world.44 It is clear then that the most
prominent form of digital property has been held to be a type of
information that can be subject to IP rights. However, not all in-
formation, including digitised information, is constitutionally eligi-
ble for protection under the copyright and patent heads of power.
1. Raw Data
The classic example of unprotected information is raw data or
ideas. Copyright law has long taken the view that it protects the
expression of data/ideas but not the raw data/ideas themselves.45
42. Id. at n.218 (citations omitted). Judge Kirby also talks of "potential bene-
fit to the community"; see also Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyber-
space 131, 133-34 (Basic Books 1999); Fitzgerald, supra note 8.
43. TRIPS, supra note 4, at art. 10 cl. 2 (providing that "Computer programs,
whether in source or object code, shall be protected as literary works under the
Berne Convention (1971)").
44. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.
3d. 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Welcome Real-Time, [2001] F.C.A. 445.
45. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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This view is known as the idea/expression dichotomy and is now
embodied in the TRIPs agreement: "Copyright protection shall ex-
tend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of opera-
tion or mathematical concepts as such."46
The United States Supreme Court decision in Feist Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.4 7 held that raw data,
namely entries in a telephone directory, was not subject to copy-
right protection. The Court explained:
The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for
copyright protection, a work must be original to the author
.... Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only
that the work was independently created by the author (as
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the req-
uisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight
amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the
grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, "no
matter how crude, humble or obvious" it might be .... Origi-
nality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even
though it closely resembles other works, so long as the simi-
larity is fortuitous, not the result of copying. To illustrate,
assume that two poets, each ignorant of the other, compose
identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original
and, hence, copyrightable.
Originality is a constitutional requirement .... In The
Trade-Mark Cases, the Court addressed the constitutional
scope of "writings." For a particular work to be classified
"under the head of writings of authors," the Court deter-
mined, "originality is required." The Court explained that
originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of
creativity: "[Wlhile the word writings may be liberally con-
strued, as it has been, to include original designs for engrav-
ing, prints, &c., it is only such as are original, and are
founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings
which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor,
embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the
like."
In Burrow-Giles, the Court distilled the same require-
ment from the Constitution's use of the word "authors." The
Court defined "author," in a constitutional sense, to mean "he
46. TRIPS, supra note 4, at art. 9 c. 2.
47. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
62 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:47
to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker." As in
The Trade-Mark Cases, the Court emphasized the creative
component of originality. It described copyright as being lim-
ited to "original intellectual conceptions of the author," and
stressed the importance of requiring an author who accuses
another of infringement to prove "the existence of those facts
of originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and
conception."
"No one may claim originality as to facts." This is be-
cause facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship.
The distinction is one between creation and discovery: the
first person to find and report a particular fact has not cre-
ated the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.
To borrow from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not
its "maker" or "originator."48
Building upon this reasoning, the Court held that the copying
of 1309 entries in the white pages of the telephone directory was
not a copyright infringement nor was the selection or arrangement
of the entries in basic alphabetical order creative enough to give a
thin layer of copyright protection to the arrangement of the
entries. 49
As a consequence of the Feist decision, arguments were made
throughout the world for the creation of a sui generis form of legal
protection for the time and expense of creating databases. In 1996,
the European Union adopted a Directive on the Legal Protection of
Databases50 that proposed a sui generis regime; later in 1996, the
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) produced pro-
posals for a similar international scheme for the protection of
databases. The EU Directive creates an exclusive sui generis right
for the makers of databases. 51 The general objective of this right is
to protect the investment of time, money and effort by the maker of
a database, irrespective of whether the database is in itself innova-
tive. According to the Directive, a database is protected if there
has been a substantial qualitative or quantitative investment in
48. Id. at 345-47 (citations omitted).
49. See BellSouth Advertising & Pub. Co. v. Donnelley Info. Pub., Inc., 999
F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993).
50. Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L77) 20.
51. Id. at art. 8. The reciprocity principle embodied in article 11 means that
database makers from countries outside the EU will not be given the benefits of
these database rights unless their countries offer comparable protection to EU
database makers.
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obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents of the database. 52
The duration of the protection provided by the Directive is fifteen
years. 53
At present, the WIPO proposal has stalled. However, the EU
Directive is slowly being introduced. 54 The U.S. Congress has con-
sidered a number of proposals for database protection but has yet
to enact a definitive sui generis regime. One proposal from 1999
was the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act,55 which read in
part:
1402. Prohibition against misappropriation
Any person who extracts, or uses in commerce, all or a sub-
stantial part, measured either quantitatively or qualitatively,
of a collection of information gathered, organized, or main-
tained by another person through the investment of substan-
tial monetary or other resources, so as to cause harm to the
actual or potential market of that other person, or a successor
in interest of that other person, for a product or service that
incorporates that collection of information and is offered or
intended to be offered for sale or otherwise in commerce by
that other person, or a successor in interest of that person,
shall be liable to that person or successor in interest for the
remedies set forth in section 1406.
This Act proposed to protect databases for up to fifteen years. 56 A
more "user friendly" proposal was the Consumer and Investor Ac-
cess to Information Act.57 Variations of both proposals are still be-
ing considered. 58 Canada and Australia do not have a sui generis
regime for database protection although both countries have been
examining the issue for some time.
An interesting question is whether the Commerce Clause
could be used to legislate such sui generis database rights in Aus-
52. See id. at art. 7.
53. Id. at art. 10.
54. See, e.g., Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L77) 20, implemented by
the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/3032) (imple-
menting the EU directive in the UK on Jan. 1, 1998); British Horseracing Board
Ltd. v. William Hill Org., [20011 R.P.C. 31 (Ch. 2001) (Eng.).
55. H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999).
56. Id. § 1408.
57. H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).
58. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 22; see also, Charles R. McManis,
Database Protection in the Digital Information Age, 7 Roger Williams Univ. L. Rev.
7 (2001).
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tralia or the United States. This issue is dealt with more fully be-
low; suffice to say, at this point the answer depends on whether the
IP clause is seen to guarantee an individual's right to access raw
data, overriding other federal constitutional clauses.
While the Canadian 59 and Australian courts may not give ex-
actly the same definition to the terms, there could be little conjec-
ture that "copyright," as listed in the respective constitutions,
embodies notions of independent creation and a modicum of crea-
tivity.60 However, a recent case in Australia concerning telephone
directories has suggested that "compilations" may not require in-
tellectual input (creativity) to secure copyright protection.
In Telstra Corporation Limited v. Desktop Marketing Systems
Pty. Ltd.,61 Judge Finkelstein of the Federal Court of Australia
held that Australia's leading telecommunications provider, Tel-
stra, could maintain an action for copyright infringement based on
their white and yellow pages telephone directories. 62 In that case,
the defendants had produced CD versions of the books with a num-
ber of value added features such as allowing people to search for
names through postcode, address or reverse phone number search-
ing.63 Judge Finkelstein, relying on a series of English decisions,
held that in the case of compilations it was not necessary for there
59. See Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v. Am. Bus. Info. Inc., [1997] 154 D.L.R.
4th 328 (Can.).
60. See, e.g., Kalamazoo (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Compact Bus. Sys. Pty. Ltd.
(1985) 5 I.P.R. 213 (Austl.); ITP Pty. Ltd. v. United Capital Pty. Ltd. (1985) 5 I.P.R.
315 (Austl.); Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [19641 1
W.L.R. 273 (Eng.); cf G A Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank Smythson Ltd. [1944] A.C.
329 (Austl.); Vaver, supra note 19, at 41-45; see also Copyright Law Review Com-
mittee, Report on the Simplification of the Copyright Act, 1968, Part 2, Categorisa-
tion of Subject Matter and Exclusive Rights and Other Issues, paras. 5.42-.47
(1999) (noting their views on the production of copyright material with computers),
at httpA/www.agps.gov.au/clrc.
61. [20011 F.C.A. 612.
62. Id. at para. 147.
63. Id. at para. 24.
The primary data that is used to produce DtMS' products is taken from
TeIstra's white pages directories and yellow pages directories. A Sydney
company, Dependable Database Data Pty. Ltd., sends every white pages
directory and yellow pages directory to the Philippines where a large team
types (the technical term is key punches) all the listings into a computer.
The information is changed in various respects. For example, abbrevia-
tions are expanded (Rd to Road), the name of the State is included, and
the information is formatted so that it may easily be read by a computer.
The information is then provided to DtMS in electronic form, usually as a
computer disk.
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to be originality in the sense of intellectual input or creativity;
sweat of the brow was sufficient.6 4 He explained:
There is debate as to the meaning of "originality" in copyright
law. Everyone agrees that for a work to be "original" it must
be independently created by the author; that is, it must not
be copied from another work. But there is a further require-
ment. The disagreement concerns the nature of that require-
ment. There are two schools of thought. On the one hand
there are those who say that copyright will only protect intel-
lectual effort, and unless there is at least some intellectual
labour in the creation of a work, it cannot be "original"....
On the other hand there is a school that argues that at
least in respect of a compilation, the originality requirement
will be satisfied if there has been some effort expended in pro-
ducing the work, especially effort in gathering or collecting
the factual data that is reproduced, though there be no inge-
nuity in the arrangement or presentation of that data.
Quite apart from matters of policy, it might be said that
the very nature of copyright requires the work to be the prod-
uct of creative thought. The first copyright statute was en-
acted "for the Encouragement of learned Men to compose and
write useful Books." These books were necessarily the result
of the author's intellectual effort. That was also true of other
works (engravings, sculptures, dramatic works and the like)
that were given copyright protection by the early statutes.
But a compilation is of a different character from a work of
art or literature. This is especially true of a compilation of
facts that are in the public domain. For this type of compila-
tion to come into existence, the facts must be selected, col-
lected, arranged in a particular fashion, and then produced in
some form. It may be possible to describe as creative the
processes of selection, collection or arrangement. But the cre-
ativity is of a different order from that involved in producing
a work of art or literature. The English cases seem implicitly
to accept this proposition, because the originality require-
The information is loaded onto the computer system maintained by
DtMS. There is some cursory validation of the data, but not to any signifi-
cant extent. Then information is added, such as the appropriate industry
code, number of employees, facsimile number and Ausdoc DX number.
The information is updated if errors are identified, or if there is a "do not
contact" attached to a particular name
Id. at paras. 25-26.
64. Id. at paras. 84-85.
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ment for a compilation could not be the same as for other
works. More particularly, when it was held that copyright
could subsist in a work such as a chemist's stock list (Collis v.
Cater), the preparation of which involved no intellectual ef-
fort, it was apparent that a work could be original in the ab-
sence of creativity. The old view of originality had
disappeared. So, copyright protection could be claimed by a
person who brought out a directory in consequence of an ex-
pensive, complicated and well organised venture, even if
there was no creativity in the selection or arrangement of the
data.
That being the law in England in 1911, it became the law
in Australia in 1912 when the English statute was adopted as
the law in this country.65
The difficulty with the approach espoused by Judge Finkel-
stein is that if creativity is not required as an element of originality
then copyright is awarded for the effort of collection and, in es-
sence, provides copyright protection of the facts. This approach be-
comes problematic if the judge (as Judge Finkelstein did in this
case) takes a broad view of what amounts to copying in order to
protect the labour of the data base compiler. While the CD ver-
sions of the books contained enhancements, the judge seem minded
to protect the labours of Telstra from wholesale copying by finding
that infringement had occurred:
In substance, the respondents say that "the look, feel, ar-
rangement, functionality, extent of information, accuracy and
purpose [of the CD-roms] are all radically different" from Tel-
stra's products. They also contend that the visual appearance
is different because the entries are alphabetically ordered by
postcode, not arranged in geographical areas, contain full
mailing addresses, have a layout that is continuous rather
than in columns on pages, and are displayed in different
fonts. When compared with the yellow pages directories, the
respondents say that these differences are heightened by the
fact that no advertisements are taken and the headings are
not proximate to a group of business names and addresses.
Instead, each business entry has its classification entered as
part of the data shown in relation to that business. As for the
headings, it is said that there has been no reproduction of the
compilation of headings because what has been reproduced
65. Id. at paras. 8, 9, 84-85.
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are individual headings in relation to individual records of
data ....
In this case, the substance of the information that has
been taken from Telstra's works (the directory portion of the
directories and the headings that appear in the yellow pages
directories and headings books) has been reproduced in the
CD-roms. It must be remembered that copyright is not
claimed for each particular entry, because copyright does not
subsist in each individual recorded fact. It is claimed in the
whole of the collected data, ordered in a particular way. As
regards the directories, the significant recorded facts (name,
address, telephone number, and the relevant type of busi-
ness) are the same, or substantially the same, as they appear
in Telstra's works. While there are differences, they are in
the detail. For example, when displayed on a screen, the in-
formation from the CD-rom does not appear as columns on a
page. But the information can be retrieved in alphabetical
order (by postcode rather than region) and can be examined
in much the same way as one would read a column on a page.
The fact that the alphabetical listings are by postcode and not
region, is not a material difference. Nor is the fact that por-
tions of the advertisements are not reproduced. As regards
the headings, it is true that they appear once only in each
yellow pages directory and that the heading appears with
each business entry in the CD-roms. This difference is imma-
terial. All the headings have been taken, as have all the list-
ings beneath those headings. The appearance of the headings
and the listings in the CD-roms is sufficiently similar to con-
stitute a reproduction. 66
The fear becomes that copyright law then takes on the job of pro-
tecting the compilation of data without adequate safeguards
against locking up information. With the emergence of sui generis
database regimes in Europe and, inevitably, the United States, it
will be interesting to see how that case is decided if it goes to a
higher court on appeal.
2. Plant Breeder's Rights-Are They Patents?
For digital property to be eligible for legislative construction
and protection under the respective IP clauses, it must fall within
some general notion of copyright or patent (and in Australia, de-
66. Id. at paras. 104, 109.
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sign or trademark). A recent case on plant breeder's rights shows
that, at least in Australia, the High Court is reluctant to construe
the constitutional mandate too narrowly so as to exclude innova-
tive informational products.
In Grain Pool of WA v. Commonwealth,67 the plaintiff claimed
that two Acts of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
were beyond the enumerated legislative powers of that parliament.
The High Court of Australia was asked to consider whether the
two pieces of legislation-the Plant Variety Rights Act, 1987, ("the
Varieties Act") and its successor, the Plant Breeder's Rights Act,
1994, ("the Breeder's Rights Act")-were duly enacted pursuant to
section 51 (xviii) of the Constitution, that as explained above, pro-
vides that the Commonwealth Parliament may make laws for the
peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with re-
spect to: "Copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and trade
marks."68
The Varieties Act provided for the grant of plant variety rights
in new plant varieties for a period of twenty years. 69 The repeal of
the Varieties Act by section 78 of the Breeder's Rights Act also
brought into operation transition provisions, particularly section
82, which stated that plant variety rights under the previous stat-
ute were to be treated as plant breeder's rights under the new stat-
ute. Pursuant to this statutory regime, the second defendant,
Cultivaust Pty. Ltd., argued that:
it was the licensee from the State of Tasmania of the Frank-
lin barley rights;
this gave it the exclusive right to sell and export Franklin
barley and
the plaintiff, in selling and exporting Franklin barley from
Australia, had acted in breach of the second defendant's
rights.7 0
The plaintiff, Grain Pool of WA, defended against the claims by as-
serting that the rights asserted by the second defendant were inef-
fective because the grant of those rights was beyond the
67. [20001 H.C.A. 14.
68. Id. at para. 13.
69. Plant Variety Rights Act, 1987, § 32 (AustI.) (commencing on the day of
acceptance of successful application).
70. Pursuant to section 26 of the Plant Variety Rights Act, a grant was made
on January 19, 1990, in favour of the Tasmanian Department of Primary Industry
and Fisheries with respect to Franklin barley.
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Commonwealth's legislative powers in section 51 (xviii), (xxix) and
(xxxix)J 1 The full bench of the High Court held that both Acts
were within the powers contained in section 51 (xviii) of the Con-
stitution and therefore it was unnecessary to consider whether the
Acts could be supported under section 51 (xxix) or (xxxix)J 2
The plaintiff had argued that the operation of section 51(xviii)
with respect to "patents of inventions" was limited by certain tradi-
tional principles of patent law. They argued that:
there were certain fixed minimum requirements for the "in-
tellectual effort" required of inventors respecting novelty and
inventive steps;
there was a crucial distinction between process and product
claims and
the term "patents" imports a constitutional requirement of
the scope of the monopoly rights which must be granted and
limits the permissible statutory qualifications to those
rights.73
The court rejected those arguments, finding that the legislative
scheme before it was sufficiently connected to the notion of "pat-
ents of invention." While inventive step, novelty and exclusive
rights might be determined differently than they would under the
Patents Act, 1990, that did not mean that the legislation was not
with respect to the subject matter of "patents of invention." In
other words, the fact that the legislation invoked unique notions of
novelty, inventive step and exclusive rights in relation to plant
breeding did not mean the legislation was beyond parliamentary
power to legislate with respect to "patents of inventions."
At a broader level, the plaintiff contended that the enumer-
ated head of legislative power in the constitution did not support
the Varieties and Breeders Act.74 In particular, they claimed that
the head of power should not be read so as to support legislation
granting rights for products of every level of intellectual effort.7 5
The majority commenced its reasoning by quoting from the
joint judgment of the High Court in Nintendo Co. v. Centronics
Systems Pty. Ltd.,76 upholding the validity of the Circuit Layouts
71. Grain Pool, [20001 H.C.A. 14 at para. 12.
72. Id. at para. 136.
73. Id. at para. 12.
74. Id. at para. 17.
75. Id.
76. (1994) 181 C.L.R. 134 (Austl.).
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Act, 1989, where the court considered the construction of the terms
of section 51(xviii):
The grant of Commonwealth legislative power which sustains
the [Circuit Layouts Act] is that contained in s 51(xviii) of the
Constitution with respect to 'Copyrights, patents of inven-
tions and designs, and trade marks'. It is of the essence of
that grant of legislative power that it authorizes the making
of laws which create, confer, and provide for the enforcement
of, intellectual property rights in original compositions, in-
ventions, designs, trade marks and other products of intellec-
tual effort.77
The majority explained that an appropriate approach to the inter-
pretation of section 51(xviii) was that of Judge Higgins in Attorney-
General for NSW v. Brewery Employes Union of NSW ("The Union
Label Case"): 78
Higgins J observed in that case that trade marks were "artifi-
cial products of society" and that whilst "we are to ascertain
the meaning of 'trade marks' as in 1900," trade marks usage
in 1900 "gives us the central type; it does not give us the cir-
cumference of the power" with respect to trade marks pro-
vided for by s 51(xviii). The centre of the thing named-trade
marks-was to be taken with the meaning as in 1900 to find
the circumference of the power. However, it would be "a mis-
take to treat the centre as the radius."79
In line with Judge Higgins's approach, the majority explained
that the broad term "intellectual effort" embraced a variable,
rather than a fixed, constitutional criterion and that the "origina-
tion" or "breeding" required respectively by the Varieties Act and
the Breeder's Rights Act involved sufficient "intellectual effort" to
enliven the power.80
Judge Kirby, in a separate judgement, advocated an approach
different from the majority regarding interpretation of the term
"patents of inventions":
The power conferred by s 51(xviii) is a very broad one. The
metes and bounds of the power are not to be ascertained in
my respectful view, by an understanding of what fell within
the class of "copyrights, patents of inventions and designs,
77. Id. at 160; see Grain Pool, [2000] H.C.A. 14 at para. 17.
78. (1908) 6 C.L.R. 469, 610-11 (Austl.).
79. Grain Pool, [2000] H.C.A. 14 at para. 19.
80. Id. at para. 42.
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and trade marks" in 1900. Because, in part of the joint rea-
sons the other members of this Court have repeatedly re-
ferred to the consideration of the ambit of "patents of
invention" in 1900-lest that consideration be thought to con-
trol, or even significantly to influence, the contemporary
meaning of the constitutional words, I am bound to express
my different viewpoint .... [the] ultimate criterion was not
pre-Federation legal understandings but a search for the "es-
sential characteristics" of the words used in the Constitution
.... The words used in the Constitution, and specifically
those used in s 51(xviii), are not shackled to the legal under-
standings about the patents power in 1900 .... Given the
objects of the head of power, which include the facilitation
and protection of intellectual inventiveness within Australia,
it would be specially destructive of the achievement of those
objects if the grant of power were to be attached-even as a
primary reference point-to the particular notions which, up
to 1900, "copyrights, patents of inventions and designs and
trade marks" had been protected by the law .... To the full
extent that the language of the Constitution warrants and
that other important values which it upholds permit, meaning
should be given to a provision such as s 51(xviii) in a way that
allows the section to respond to the very great variety of in-
ventiveness that may be considered by the Federal Parlia-
ment to necessitate protection for the "products of intellectual
effort."8'
C. The Length of Time a Property Right Will Endure
The United States Constitution contains the express words
that the IP rights legislated should be for "limited Times." It could
81. Id. at paras. 90, 103, 132-33, 135 (emphasis added). Also consider the fol-
lowing passage from Judge Kirby's judgment:
However, the advent of biogenetically engineered organisms and of inven-
tions in the field of information technology have stimulated an apparently
increased willingness on the part of United States courts to recognise the
way in which patents and analogous forms of legal protection can some-
times encourage technological innovation to the economic and social bene-
fit of the United States and beyond. The specific inclusion of s 51(xviii) in
the Australian Constitution affords a further reason for assigning to s
51(xviii) a meaning that permits the protection of "products of intellectual
effort" in the variety in which such products now manifest themselves and
the even greater variety in which they can be expected to appear in the
future.
Id. at para. 134.
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be read to be an explicit guarantee of the public domain. In the
recent case of Eldred v. Reno,8 2 the constitutional validity of the
Copyright Term Extension Act, 1998 (CTEA)8 3 legislation ex-
tending the U.S. copyright term from life of the author plus fifty
years to life of the author plus seventy years,84 was questioned.
The plaintiffs, who were in the business of publishing materials
when copyright had expired, argued that the CTEA was unconsti-
tutional for three reasons:
in both its prospective and retrospective applications the
CTEA unjustifiably infringes upon freedom of speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment;
in its application to preexisting works, the CTEA violates the
originality requirement of the Copyright Clause;
in extending the term of subsisting copyrights, the CTEA vio-
lates the "limited Times" requirement of the Copyright
Clause.8 5
The First Amendment argument, which was rejected, is con-
sidered below. On the issue of lack of originality, the court dis-
posed of the issue saying:
The plaintiffs reason from this that the CTEA cannot extend
an extant copyright because the copyrighted work already ex-
ists and therefore lacks originality. Not so. Originality is
what made the work copyrightable in the first place. A work
with a subsisting copyright has already satisfied the require-
ment of originality and need not do so anew for its copyright
to persist. If the Congress could not extend a subsisting copy-
right for want of originality, it is hard to see how it could pro-
vide for a copyright to be renewed at the expiration of its
initial term-a practice dating back to 1790 and not ques-
tioned even by the plaintiffs today.8 6
The plaintiffs were also unsuccessful on the issue of "limited
Times." The court explained that, at widest, if "Congress were to
make copyright protection permanent, then it surely would exceed
the power conferred upon it by the Copyright Clause."87 It went on
to dispose of the argument at hand by saying:
82. 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
84. This change was made to bring the U.S. copyright law into line with the
EU.
85. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 374.
86. Id. at 376-77.
87. Id. at 377.
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The present plaintiffs want a limit well short of the rule
against perpetuities, of course. And they claim to have found
it-or at least a bar to extending the life of a subsisting copy-
right-in the preamble of the Copyright Clause: "The Con-
gress shall have power ... To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.. . ." Their idea is that the phrase "limited
Times" should be interpreted not literally but rather as
reaching only as far as is justified by the preambular state-
ment of purpose: If 50 years are enough to "promote.. . Pro-
gress," then a grant of 70 years is unconstitutional. Here the
plaintiffs run squarely up against our holding in Schnapper v.
Foley, in which we rejected the argument "that the introduc-
tory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on
congressional power." The plaintiffs, however, disclaim any
purpose to question the holding of Schnapper; indeed, they
expressly acknowledge "that the preamble of the Copyright
Clause is not a substantive limit on Congress' legislative
power." Their argument is simply that "the Supreme Court
has interpreted the terms 'Authors' and 'Writings' in light of
that preamble, and that this Court should do the same with
'limited Times.'"
The problems with this argument are manifest. First,
one cannot concede that the preamble "is not a substantive
limit" and yet maintain that it limits the permissible dura-
tion of a copyright more strictly than does the textual require-
ment that it be for a "limited Time." Second, although the
plaintiffs claim that Feist supports using the preamble to in-
terpret the rest of the Clause, the Court in Feist never so
much as mentions the preamble, let alone suggests that the
preamble informs its interpretation of the substantive grant
of power to the Congress (which there turned upon the mean-
ing of "Authors" and of "Writings," each standing alone).
Similarly, the Trade-Mark Cases cited in Feist rest upon the
originality implied by "invention [and] discovery" and by the
"writings of authors," and make no reference at all to the
preamble.8 8
Such reasoning goes close to conflicting with the following
statement of the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.8 9
"The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not over-
reach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.
88. Id. at 377-78 (citation omitted).
89. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the in-
novation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby."9° It also
goes close to conflicting with the following passage from Morton
Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.:91
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent
monopoly carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
.. Inventors the exclusive Right. . ." to their "new and use-
ful" inventions. United States Constitution. But the public
policy which includes inventions within the granted monop-
oly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the invention.
It equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive
right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office
and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.92
In United States v. Moghadam,9 3 a case concerning the constitu-
tional validity of the anti-bootlegging statute (considered in more
depth below), the court made note of the apparent perpetual dura-
tion of the intellectual property rights granted under the statute:
We note that there is another limitation in the Copyright
Clause that may be implicated by the anti-bootlegging stat-
ute: the "Limited Times" requirement that forbids Congress
from conferring intellectual property rights of perpetual du-
ration. On its face, the protection created by the anti-bootleg-
ging statute is apparently perpetual and contains no express
time limit; therefore phonorecords of live musical perform-
ances would presumably never fall into the public domain.
However, because Moghadam has not challenged the consti-
tutionality of § 2319A on this basis, we decline to raise the
issue sua sponte. Thus, we do not decide in this case whether
extending copyright-like protection under the anti-bootleg-
ging statute might be fundamentally inconsistent with the
"Limited Times" requirement of the Copyright Clause, and
we do not decide in this case whether the Commerce Clause
can provide the source of Congressional power to sustain the
application of the anti-bootlegging statute in some other case
90. Id. at 5-6.
91. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
92. Id. at 492 (citations omitted).
93. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2000).
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in which such an argument is preserved. We reserve those
issues for another day.94
In Canada and Australia the issue of limited times is not as-
sisted by express recognition of such a limit in the constitutional
mandate. However, upon further consideration of the matter there
could be little argument in Australia or Canada with the view that
the granting of intellectual property rights is in some way limited
by the reason for granting those rights. 95 In fact, by way of tradi-
tion 96 and under International law,97 there are limits-statutory
intellectual property rights (IPR) are generally of a limited term
and in certain circumstances subject to uses without permission of
the IPR owner-and based on the rationale (even if somewhat
vague) that allowing monopoly rights in information benefits soci-
ety as a whole through the creation of value added informational
products.98 Whether such a balance is achieved is a moot point.99
Vaver argues that "[if the rights restrict availability and use more
than they increase them, they are unjustifiable .. 1.0.loo
In defining a patent, Judge Kirby in Grain Pool referred to its
limited nature. He explained:
Upon this basis, the lawmaking power with respect to "pat-
ents of inventions" within s 51(xviii) involves the provision by
94. Id. at 1281 (citations and footnote omitted).
95. See Australian Trade Marks Act, 1995, §§17, 72, 75. Although some may
suggest statutory trademarks are of perpetual duration it is important to note they
are usually only recognised where there is evidence of intended or actual use and
are registered for a period of ten years, which can be renewed.
96. See Statute of Anne (1709) 8 Ann., c. 21 (Eng.); Statute of Monopolies,
1623, 21 & 22 Jam. 1, c. 3 (Eng.); Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 231-32 (K.B.
1769).
97. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(1971). International law can be used to assist in constitutional interpretation in
Australia. See, e.g., Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth [19981 H.C.A. 22 (Austl.); "Appli-
cant A" v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 142 A.L.R. 331
(Austl.); Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 146 A.L.R. 126 (Austl.); Newcrest Min-
ing (WA) Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 C.L.R. 513 (Austl.); Minister for Immi-
gration & Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273 (Austl.); Horta v.
Commonwealth (1994) 181 C.L.R. 183 (Austl.); Bryan Horrigan & Brian F. Fitzger-
ald, International and Transnational Influences on Law and Policy Affecting Gov-
ernment, in Government Law and Policy § 1 (Bryan Horrigan ed., 1998).
98. See Landes & Posner, supra note 12 (discussing the utilitarian/economic
nature of such thinking); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 429-32; Vaver, supra note 19,
at 87-96 (noting the relevance of moral rights in Canadian copyright law).
99. See Vaver, supra note 19, at 6-8.
100. Id. at 8.
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the state to the grantee of exclusive rights for a limited time
to exploit, and to authorise other persons to exploit, a novel
object or process of potential benefit to the community in re-
spect of which a patent may be granted and which is recorded
in a public register upon conditions of disclosure. This is the
bedrock. Nothing more is required by the "really essential
characteristics" of "patents of inventions."10 1
While agreeing that the section 51 (xviii) head of power should be
read generously, Judge Kirby made it clear that intellectual prop-
erty rights should not be regarded as absolute; they must be con-
structed in the context of their proprietary purpose. He explained
"the protection of intellectual property rights must be afforded in a
constitutional setting which upholds other values of public good in
a representative democracy." 10 2
In contrast, by suggesting Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
United States Constitution is narrower than section 51 (xviii) in
that it requires a purpose of promoting the progress of science and
the useful arts, the majority in Grain Pool appears to say that a
variety of intellectual property rights (from low to high intellectual
input) can be legislated under the section 51 (xviii) head of power.
It is not clear whether the majority is also suggesting that these
rights, once legislated, have any constitutional limit in the name of
the public domain. 10 3 Likewise, the following passage from Judge
Higgins in the Union Label case might suggest that there are no
constitutional limits on intellectual property rights: "The power to
make laws 'with respect to' these rights involves the power to de-
clare what shall be the subject of the rights."10 4 But that is far
from clear.
Further conjecture on this issue was raised by the High Court
in explaining the notion of "property" in Yanner v. Eaton:10 5
It refers to a degree of power that is recognised in law as
power permissibly exercised over the thing. The concept of
"property" may be elusive. Usually it is treated as a "bundle
of rights." But even this may have its limits as an analytical
101. Grain Pool, [20001 H.C.A. 14 at para. 135 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at n.218.
103. Id. at para. 32 ("In particular it will be open to the Parliament to pursue
its policies by legislation with respect to various subject-matters, if one of them
appears in s 51 (xviii) on an adequate reading of that text.").
104. (1908) 6 C.L.R. 469, 611 (Austl.).
105. (1999) 201 C.L.R. 351 (Austl.).
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tool or accurate description, and it may be, as Professor Gray
has said, that "the ultimate fact about property is that it does
not really exist: it is mere illusion." Considering whether, or
to what extent, there can be property in knowledge or infor-
mation or property in human tissue may illustrate some of
the difficulties in deciding what is meant by "property" in a
subject matter.1 6
There is strong indication in this passage that informational rights
do have boundaries. Furthermore, the passage expressly acknowl-
edges that power is inherent in the notion of property. As it is the
function of law to mediate power relations in the name of a pros-
perous, humane and ordered society, one could logically assert that
property will have some legally defined limits.
Lessig argues that just as real property has limits, e.g., it can
be zoned,. so does intellectual property, e.g., fair use in copyright
law and these limits, when imposed, ensure that the collective in-
terest of society to access or use are privileged over the absolute
interest of the property holder. 10 7 Likewise, Judge Kirby's ap-
proach challenges us to conceptualise a more principled construct
of intellectual property in accordance with the notion that "no
right is absolute."' 08 Are we to expect from such reasoning a view
that demands (in a constitutional sense) that intellectual property
rights must yield to the public domain where necessary? And will
such reasoning support the notion that as intellectual property
rights have had and still do have limited terms (based on a mixture
of economic utility and the democratic and social value of the pub-
lic domain), 10 9 the constitutional power to create such rights is
subject to limits, specifically, a requirement that intellectual prop-
erty rights be granted for limited terms?" Further, will we see
106. Id. at 366; see generally Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private
Property, 108 Yale L.J. 1163 (1999) (arguing that private property is not a useful
analytic concept unless it can be practically bounded).
107. See generally Lessig, supra note 42, at 131-35 (1999) (discussing the limits
on the protection of property).
108. See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire
in a theater, and causing a panic.").
109. Brian F. Fitzgerald, Underlying Rationales of Fair Use: Simplifying the
Copyright Act, 2 S. Cross U. L. Rev. 153 (1998), available at http://www.scu.edu.au-
schools/lawj (last visited Nov. 3, 2001).
110. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 42, at 133-34 (explaining that in the United
States, exclusive copyrights are granted for a limited term in accordance with the
United States Constitution, and arguing the term should be limited by and linked
78 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:47
arguments suggesting that there is a constitutional guarantee to
the public domain?'"
The Grain Pool case raises interesting questions concerning
intellectual property and constitutional principle for the informa-
tion age. It shows the willingness of the High Court of Australia to
allow the Commonwealth or Federal Parliament to legislate on is-
sues of intellectual product and gives insight into the variable defi-
nition of the term "patents of invention." On this plane, the High
Court is clearly saying that, in terms of the federal division of leg-
islative powers, the Commonwealth Parliament has a broad power
to legislate on matters relating to intellectual effort. On another
plane, Judge Kirby's judgement is extremely interesting in that it
suggests that intellectual property rights do have constitutionally
defined limits. In other words, the relationship of power between
the Commonwealth Parliament and the people in legislating intel-
lectual property rights is not absolute. 112 In their silence on this
issue, the majority raises concerns and uncertainty as to the limits
of intellectual property rights in the information age. 113 We must
be mindful that in an era when information is a core economic and
cultural resource, it is vital as democratic principle that the legal
to the purpose for which the exclusive rights are granted, progressing not hinder-
ing the useful arts); see generally Eldred, 239 F.3d at 372 (challenging the exten-
sion of U.S. copyright term to life of the author plus seventy years).
111. See generally Lessig, supra note 42, at 133-34 (arguing that the public do-
main is implied in the United States Constitution as a consequence of the require-
ment that exclusive rights be for limited times).
112. See generally Brian F. Fitzgerald, Proportionality and Australian Consti-
tutionalism, 12 U. Tas. L. Rev. 263 (1993) (discussing the notion of sovereignty in
Australian constitutional law).
113. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic
Guide to the Network Economy (1999); Benkler, supra note 10; Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809,
814-17 (1935); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So
Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Public-
ity, 20 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 123 (1996); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive
Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 397 (1989); Brian F. Fitzgerald, Conceptualising the Digital Environment, in
Going Digital 2000: Legal Issues for E-Commerce Software and the Internet 1
(Anne Fitzgerald et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transition From Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
621 (1998); David Lange, Recognising The Public Domain, 44 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 147 (1981); Ejan Mackaay, The Economics of Emergent Property Rights on
the Internet, in The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment 13 (P. Bernt
Hugenholtz ed. 1996).
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process of commodifying information through intellectual property
law be clearly defined and understood.
D. Fixed in a Tangible Medium?
A hallmark of copyright and patent law is that the intellectual
knowledge must be embodied, manifested or fixed in a tangible me-
dium. A recent Australian report by the Copyright Law Reform
Commission suggests that in the realm of copyright law the whole
notion of fixation in a tangible medium is redundant in the digital
age and should be removed or at least reconceptualised as a crite-
rion for copyright protection. 114
While there is no express requirement for fixation in a tangi-
ble medium in the Australian or Canadian Constitutions, the word
"writings" in the United States clause implies some notion of fixa-
tion. The issue was raised but not finally resolved in Moghadam.
That case concerned the constitutional validity of an anti-bootleg-
ging statute 1 5 criminalizing the unauthorized recording, trans-
mission to the public, and sale or distribution of or traffic in
unauthorized recordings of live musical performances.' 16
Moghadam was convicted of violating the statute after he pleaded
guilty to knowingly distributing, selling and trafficking in bootleg
(unauthorized) compacts discs featuring live musical performances
by recording artists including Tori Amos and the Beastie Boys.
Moghadam then sought to challenge the constitutional validity of
the statute arguing it did not fall within any of the federal legisla-
tive powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Con-
stitution.1 7 The government responded that it was constitutional
under either the Copyright Clause or the Commerce Clause. 118
The anti-bootlegging statute, which was enacted as a consequence
of and in implementation of the TRIPS agreement provides in 18
U.S.C. section 2319A that:
(a) Whoever, without the consent of the performer or per-
formers involved, knowingly and for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain-
114. Copyright Law Review Committee, supra note 60, at paras. 5,48-.53.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
116. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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(1) fixes the sound or sounds and images of a live musical
performance in a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces cop-
ies or phonorecords of such a performance from an unau-
thorized fixation;
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public
the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical per-
formance; or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell,
rents or offers to rent, or traffics in any copy or pho-
norecord fixed as described in paragraph (1), regardless of
whether the fixations occurred in the United States;
shall be imprisoned . . . or fined ... or both .... 119
The Act also contains a similar provision establishing civil liability
for the same conduct but omitting the commercial advantage or
private financial gain requirement.120 There is little legislative
history dealing with either provision because the Act was rushed
through Congress on fast-track procedures, yet what exists sug-
gests that Congress viewed the anti-bootlegging provisions as en-
acted pursuant to its Copyright Clause authority. 121
The court explained that the rights created by the anti-boot-
legging provisions were actually hybrid rights that in some ways
resembled the protection of copyright law but in other ways were
distinct.122 The court explained that it was unclear whether long-
standing concepts generally applicable to copyright law such as
fair use, the work-for-hire doctrine and limited duration, apply to
the anti-bootlegging provisions. 123 The court noted that in con-
trast to the six exclusive rights of a copyright owner spelled out in
17 U.S.C. section 106, it appeared that the only exclusive right cre-
ated by the anti-bootlegging statute is to record and/or re-commu-
nicate one's performance. 124 For all of those reasons, the court
concluded that the protection the anti-bootlegging statute confers
119. Id. at 1272.
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994).
121. 140th Cong. Rec. H11441, H11457 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Hughes) ("There are a number of changes in copyright that will advance our
interests in the area of bootlegging, which is going to basically protect our
country.").
122. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1272.
123. Id. at 1273.
124. Id.
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on musicians is best described as "quasi-copyright" or sui generis
protection. 125
Judge Anderson, writing the opinion for the court, held the
statute to be validly enacted under the Commerce Clause. On the
issue of the Copyright Clause, the court explained:
This positive grant of legislative authority includes several
limitations. Of these limitations, Moghadam has relied in the
instant case only on the concept of "fixation" which is said to
be embedded in the term "Writings."
The concept of fixation suggests that works are not copy-
rightable unless reduced to some tangible form. "If the word
'writings' is to be given any meaning whatsoever, it must, at
the very least, denote some material form, capable of identifi-
cation and having a more or less permanent endurance." Of
course, the term "Writings" has been interpreted so broadly
as to include much more than writings in the literal sense, or
the lay definition of the word. In fact, since a sound recording
qualifies as a "Writing" in the constitutional sense, "it is now
clear that a writing may be perceptible either visually or au-
rally .... " But the fixation requirement seems to have per-
sisted through this expansion. Thus, although in the modem
era the term "Writings" allows Congress to extend copyright
protection to a great many things, those things have always
involved some fixed, tangible and durable form.
Moghadam argues that a live performance, by definition,
has not been reduced to a tangible form or fixed as of the time
of the performance. Moghadam argues that, but for the boot-
legger's decision to record, a live performance is fleeting and
evanescent.
Because we affirm the conviction in the instant case on
the basis of an alternative source of Congressional power, we
decline to decide in this case whether the fixation concept of
Copyright Clause can be expanded so as to encompass live
performances that are merely capable of being reduced to
tangible form, but have not been. For purposes of this case,
we assume arguendo, without deciding, that the above de-
scribed problems with the fixation requirement would pre-
clude the use of the Copyright Clause as a source of
Congressional power for the anti-bootlegging statute. 126
125. Id.
126. 175 F.3d at 1273-74.
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E. The Commerce Clause
The enumerated powers in the United States and Australian
Constitutions are designed to allocate legislative responsibilities
between the federal and state governments. They do not necessa-
rily limit governmental power or bestow rights on individuals, al-
though clearly one provision in the Australian Constitution does-
section 51 (xxxi). In recent times serious arguments have been
made-in the context of proposed database legislation and the Dig-
ital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)127-that the specific re-
quirements of the IP clause define the parameters of the
propertization of information through legislative means. 128 In es-
sence, the argument is that the IP clause is both a grant of power
and a limitation on government power ensuring such fundamental
information rights of user and access, such as the right to ideas,
the public domain and fair use.129
An even more interesting argument arising from this ap-
proach is whether state governments are in any way limited by the
specific requirements of the IP clause. In other words, does the IP
clause in any way preempt state legislation on this topic? Gold-
stein held that the American states have, subject to preemption by
legislation, 130 a concurrent power to legislate upon intellectual
property rights. 13 In that case, the Supreme Court implied that
the states are not constrained by any limits in the federal IP clause
as the legislation in question, which the Court upheld, allowed per-
petual duration of copyright-in contrast to the limited times re-
quirement in the federal clause. 132
The clause most likely to undermine the IP clause at the fed-
eral level is the Commerce Clause. The United States Commerce
Clause reads that Congress has the legislative authority "[t]o regu-
127. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1332 (Supp. IV 1998).
128. See Marci A. Hamilton, Database Protection and the Circuitous Route
Around the United States Constitution, in International Intellectual Property and
the Common Law World (Charles E.F. Rickett & Graeme W. Austin eds., 2000); see
also, Benkler supra note 10, at 440-46; Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied
Constitutional Limits on Congressional Power: Construing the Commerce Power in
Light of the Intellectual Property Clause, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1119 (2000); William
Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent
Constitutional Collision, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 359 (1999).
129. See John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 5.
130. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
131. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 560.
132. Id. at 560-61.
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late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States
.... 133 The Australian Commerce Clause reads that the Com-
monwealth Parliament may make laws for the peace, order and
good government of the Commonwealth with respect to trade and
commerce with other countries and among the States.' 3 '
In Moghadam, the court refused to decide whether the anti-
bootlegging statute could be upheld under the Copyright Clause;
they were of the view that it came within the Commerce Clause. 3 5
The court reviewed the two opposing precedents in light of the
Commerce Clause in the face of other clauses and concluded that it
was not against the spirit of the Constitution to allow the statutes
to be upheld under the Commerce Clause. They reasoned that this
type of legislation supplemented copyright protection and should
be allowed.136
The court started out by confirming that section 2319A con-
cerned conduct that had a substantial effect on commerce between
the several states and commerce with foreign nations, namely the
sale of bootleg compact discs. The court explained that the more
interesting question was whether Congress could use the Com-
merce Clause to avoid the limitations that might prevent it from
passing the same legislation under the Copyright Clause. They
explained:
that in general, the various grants of legislative authority
contained in the Constitution stand alone and must be inde-
pendently analyzed. In other words, each of the powers of
Congress is alternative to all of the other powers, and what
cannot be done under one of them may very well be doable
under another. 137
The court noted that this general approach had been applied previ-
ously in a context involving the Copyright Clause and the Com-
merce Clause, namely, the Trade-Mark Cases.138 In those cases,
the constitutional validity of an early trademark law enacted by
Congress in 1876 was at issue. The Supreme Court held that the
Copyright Clause could not sustain the 1876 Act because "[tihe or-
dinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discov-
133. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
134. Aust. Const. § 51(i).
135. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1269.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1277.
138. See United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
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ery," which were the hallmarks of protectable subject matter under
the Copyright Clause.139 The Court explained that trademarks
were inherently commercial; the concept behind the 1876 Act (and
modern trademark law) was not to encourage intellectual and ar-
tistic development, but rather to protect businesses from predatory
behaviour in the marketplace. 140 This concept was said to be
outside the ambit of the legislative power contained in the IP
clause. 141
However, that was not the end of the matter and the Supreme
Court proceeded to test the validity of the statute against the Com-
merce Clause. As the Commerce Clause at that time was narrowly
construed, the legislation was not upheld. Since that time, an ex-
panding view of the ambit of the Commerce Clause means that to-
day the modem variant of this trademark law, the Lanham Act, is
seen to be an exercise of the commerce clause. 142 The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals summarised this point, saying that "al-
though the 1876 Act did not survive due to the restrictive view of
the Commerce Clause prevailing at that time, the Supreme Court's
analysis in the Trade-Mark Cases stands for the proposition that
legislation, which would not be permitted under the Copyright
Clause, could nonetheless be permitted under the Commerce
Clause, provided that the independent requirements of the latter
are met."143
However, the court noted that another line of authority stood
in contrast to the Trade-Mark Cases and needed more considera-
tion. In Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons,'44 the Su-
preme Court considered a statute enacted by Congress that
purported to alter a pending bankruptcy case by requiring the
debtor railroad company's bankruptcy estate to pay $75 million to
the company's former employees. That statute directly clashed
with the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution, 14 5
which provides that Congress is empowered to pass "uniform"
139. Id. at 94.
140. See id. at 94-99.
141. See id. at 96-98.
142. See Michael B. Gerdes, Comment, Getting Beyond Constitutionally Man-
dated Originality as a Prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection, 24 Ariz. St.
L.J. 1461, 1467 (1992).
143. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278.
144. 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
145. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4
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bankruptcy laws, because the law targeted a particular situation
and was anything but uniform. The Supreme Court rejected the
view that the legislation could nevertheless be sustained under the
Commerce Clause, which contains no uniformity requirement,
stating that "if we were to hold that Congress had the power to
enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on
the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws."146 The court rec-
onciled the authorities, saying:
We note that there is some tension between the former line of
cases (Heart of Atlanta, the Trade-Mark Cases and Authors
League) and the Railway Labor Executives case. The former
cases suggest that in some circumstances the Commerce
Clause can be used by Congress to accomplish something that
the Copyright Clause might not allow. But the Railway La-
bor Executives case suggests that in some circumstances the
Commerce Clause cannot be used to eradicate a limitation
placed upon Congressional power in another grant of power.
For purposes of the instant case, we resolve this tension in
the following manner. In resolving this tension and in reach-
ing our conclusion in this case, we undertake a circumscribed
analysis, deciding only what is necessary to decide this case,
and we reach a narrow conclusion. First, as described above,
we hold the anti-bootlegging statute satisfies the "substantial
effects" test of the post-Lopez Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. Second, following the former line of cases (Heart of At-
lanta, the Trade-Mark Cases and Authors League), we hold
that in some circumstances the Commerce Clause indeed
may be used to accomplish that which may not have been per-
missible under the Copyright Clause. We hold that the in-
stant case is one such circumstance in which the Commerce
Clause may be thus used. It is at this point that we must re-
solve the tension with Railway Labor Executives.
Resolving this tension, we take as a given that there are
some circumstances, as illustrated by Railway Labor Execu-
tives, in which the Commerce Clause cannot be used by Con-
gress to eradicate a limitation placed upon Congress in
another grant of power. For the reasons that follow, we hold
that the instant case is not one such circumstance. We hold
that the Copyright Clause does not envision that Congress is
positively forbidden from extending copyright-like protection
146. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468-69.
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under other constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce
Clause, to works of authorship that may not meet the fixation
requirement inherent in the term "Writings." The grant itself
is stated in positive terms, and does not imply any negative
pregnant that suggests that the term "Writings" operates as a
ceiling on Congress' ability to legislate pursuant to other
grants. Extending quasi-copyright protection to unfixed live
musical performances is in no way inconsistent with the Cop-
yright Clause, even if that Clause itself does not directly au-
thorize such protection. Quite the contrary, extending such
protection actually complements and is in harmony with the
existing scheme that Congress has set up under the Copy-
right Clause. A live musical performance clearly satisfies the
originality requirement. Extending quasi-copyright protec-
tion also furthers the purpose of the Copyright Clause to pro-
mote the progress of the useful arts by securing some
exclusive rights to the creative author. Finally, with respect
to the fixation requirement, upon which this opinion focuses,
although a live musical performance may not have been fixed,
or reduced to tangible form, as of the time the bootleg copy
was made, it certainly was subject to having been thus fixed.
Our conclusion that extending copyright-like protection in
the instant case is not fundamentally inconsistent with the
fixation requirement of the Copyright Clause is bolstered by
an example from the prior copyright law. If a live perform-
ance is broadcast, e.g., by radio or television, and simultane-
ously recorded by the performer, any unauthorized recording
by a person receiving the broadcast constitutes copyright in-
fringement of the sound recording or motion picture, notwith-
standing that the infringer actually copied the live
performance directly, and not the fixation thereof. This re-
sult is based upon the last sentence of the definition of "fixed"
in 17 U.S.C. § 101. That last sentence provides: "A work con-
sisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted,
is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is
being made simultaneously with its transmission." This defi-
nition creates a legal fiction that the simultaneous fixation
occurs before the transmission and the unauthorized record-
ing .... While we are aware that the constitutionality of this
aspect of the statute has never been tested, the ease with
which it has been incorporated into the prior copyright law
suggests that fixation, as a constitutional concept, is some-
thing less than a rigid, inflexible barrier to Congressional
power. Indeed, if a performer under the prior law could effec-
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tively protect a live musical performance, circumventing the
fixation requirement, simply by the device of simultaneous
recordation, the anti-bootlegging law seems to us like more of
an incremental change than a constitutional breakthrough.
Common sense does not indicate that extending copyright-
like protection to a live performance is fundamentally incon-
sistent with the Copyright Clause.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that extending
copyright-like protection in the instant case is not fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the fixation requirement of the Copy-
right Clause. By contrast, the nonuniform bankruptcy
statute at issue in Railway Labor Executives was irreconcila-
bly inconsistent with the uniformity requirement of the
Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution. 147
The question remains as to whether a sui generis database law en-
acted pursuant to the Commerce Clause would survive constitu-
tional challenge. The argument would be made that the IP clause
requires originality (a modicum of creativity and something that
emanates from the author) and that allowing information to be
propertized in situations where originality is not evident would be
unconstitutional. 148 The focus of the argument is whether the IP
clause sets the parameters for propertizing information through its
specific requirements. One problem with this approach is that the
IP clause was established in another era. Nowadays, information
is a lifeblood, both in social and economic terms, and it is conceiva-
ble that new ways of propertizing information have emerged and
will continue to emerge that will demand protection; yet the IP
clause may not be up to this challenge in conceptualisation. A con-
sequence of limiting the Commerce Clause in this respect may be
that interested parties will resort to the states to enact their legis-
lation (difficult, in the face of section 301 of the Copyright Act).
This may result in less than desirable outcomes. While it is clear
that restricting the scope of the Commerce Clause in the face of the
IP clause has merit and legal precedent to support it, an over-zeal-
ous implementation of such a principle could mortify constitutional
interpretation, stifle incentive to create and ensuing innovation
and retard thinking about new forms of digital property.
147. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279-81.
148. See supra note 128.
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In Australia, a similar question concerning the commerce
clause and IP clause could arise although the specific requirements
of the U.S. clause are not explicit and possibly not implicit in the
Australian clause. This is nevertheless a dormant issue that needs
to be considered when legislating in this area.149
In summary, note that specific limits inherent in the IP clause
may be asserted in constitutional litigation. The law in light of
Moghadam appears to suggest that specific limits pertaining to the
IP clause will limit the Commerce Clause in certain cases and that
this might be an obstacle for any sui generis database law in the
United States.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE: FREE SPEECH, ACCESS TO
INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE
The second dimension of traditional constitutional principle
that promises to define, if not influence, the boundary of digital
property is that of free speech-constitutionally and expressly en-
shrined in the United States First Amendment, and Article 2 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights 50 and, existing to a limited and im-
plied degree, in the context of political speech in Australia. 151 As to
this point, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which has been vigorously asserted in recent times by advocates
fearful of growing intellectual property rights, has not been consid-
ered by the courts to be of overriding concern.
This is not to say that free speech considerations have not in-
fluenced the development and implementation of intellectual prop-
erty law. The notion of free speech is implicated in the definition
or construction of digital property because we use copyrighted/pat-
ented/trademarked items in the process of communicating-in con-
structing knowledge and meaning. The most obvious example
might be when I copy an image and display it on my website. If
that use is purely commercial then any chance of a fair dealing or
fair use defence is weak, yet the more its shades into political or
149. See Australian Tape Mfrs. v. Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 176
C.L.R. 480 (Austl.) (while the general rule is that each head of legislative power
stands alone, the High Court has interpreted section 51 (xxxi) of the Australian
Constitution (the Australian version of the U.S. Takings Clause) as both a grant of
power and a limitation on other powers in certain circumstances).
150. See Fewer, supra note 19, at 226-39.
151. See Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 145 A.L.R. 96 (Austl.).
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social commentary or research the more likely we are to have an
allowable use.
Software which is integral to the digital communicative pro-
cess is also an interesting example. Software is a form of dis-
course, making things manifest or allowing them to be seen; it is
part of the speech or communicative process in the digital environ-
ment. If I propertize software through copyright or patent, I allow
a certain degree of control over communication.
In the United States, those adamant that IP rights must ac-
commodate the necessity of consuming information and democrati-
cally distributed intelligence-the cultural or social aspects as
opposed to the economics of information-have focused on First
Amendment arguments. In order to speak and communicate or
think and construct knowledge in the new digital environment, we
need to be able to access and distribute information. "A broad dis-
semination of principles, ideas, and factual information is crucial
to the robust public debate and informed citizenry that are 'the es-
sence of self-government.' And every citizen must be permitted
freely to marshal ideas and facts in the advocacy of particular po-
litical choices."152 This is the essence of the debate, although the
desire for informational liberty or diversity is not limited to just
the political realm but also encompasses the economic, social and
cultural plane.
A. Reconciling Free Speech and Copyright
In Harper & Row Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the United States
Supreme Court explained "Itihe Second Circuit noted, correctly,
that copyright's idea/expression dichotomy '[strikes] a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an au-
thor's expression.' No author may copyright his ideas or the facts
he narrates."153 In another passage the Court referred to "copy-
right as the engine of free expression," as it gave incentive for peo-
152. Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1964)).
153. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
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ple to express ideas.' 54 The existence of the fair use, along with
other exceptions, was also important. 155
The defendants in Harper & Row had extracted/copied 300
words from former President Gerald Ford's biography, before it
was published, ruining a deal that had been made with Time Mag-
azine to do a pre-publication piece of 12,000 words. The Supreme
Court held that copying 300 words was not a fair use as it con-
tained the most sensational details, including information about
former President Nixon's pardon (quality not quantity mattered
here), and ruined an aspect of the commercial exploitation of the
work. The defendants argued for a special public figure or interest
exception on top of fair use that would allow copyrighted work to
be used in social communication. The Court rejected that argu-
ment, noting that copyright was itself an engine of free expression
making it possible and rewarding for people to invest in the devel-
opment and dissemination of ideas. 15 6 As the Act stood, there was
sufficient reconciliation of the commodifying or propertizing of in-
formation through copyright and the notion of free speech.
The First Amendment challenge to intellectual property legis-
lation was dealt a further blow in the Eldred decision when the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia en-
dorsed and reaffirmed the holding in Harper & Row that the Copy-
right Act and the First Amendment are adequately reconciled
through the notions of the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair
use (along with other permissive use) doctrine(s).' 57 In other
words, since the Copyright Act protects expression of ideas and not
the ideas themselves, there is technically no barrier to any commu-
nicative activity. Furthermore, fair use makes socially necessary
material available in the face of the exclusive rights of the owner.
In Eldred, the plaintiffs argued that the CTEA violated the
First Amendment and was unconstitutional.158 The court
explained:
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Harper & Row Pub-
lishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises and of this court in United
Video, Inc. v. FCC, stand as insuperable bars to plaintiffs'
154. Id. at 558.
155. Id. at 560.
156. Id. at 558.
157. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375.
158. Id. at 374.
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first amendment theory. In Harper & Row the Court held
that a magazine's advance publication of excerpts from the
memoirs of former President Gerald Ford infringed the copy-
right thereon. In doing so the Court explained how the re-
gime of copyright itself respects and adequately safeguards
the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment ....
The [F]irst [A]mendment objection of the magazine was mis-
placed "[in view of the First Amendment protections already
embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between copy-
rightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas,
and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally
afforded by fair use." In keeping with this approach, we held
in United Video that copyrights are categorically immune
from challenges under the First Amendment. There, certain
cable companies petitioned for review of an FCC regulation
providing that the supplier of a syndicated television program
could agree to the program being broadcast exclusively by a
single station in a local broadcast area. We rejected the first
amendment aspect of their challenge as follows:
In the present case, the petitioners desire to make com-
mercial use of the copyrighted works of others. There is no
first amendment right to do so. Although there is some ten-
sion between the Constitution's [Clopyright [Cilause and the
first amendment, the familiar idea/expression dichotomy of
copyright law, under which ideas are free but their particular
expression can be copyrighted, has always been held to give
adequate protection to free expression. 159
The plaintiffs argued that those authorities were restricted
solely to the narrow case where a litigant demands a right to use
otherwise legitimately copyrighted material, which was distinct
from the litigation at hand that sought to challenge the constitu-
tional validity of the Copyright Act itself. The court rejected this
purported distinction as being "totally illusory."160 The court ex-
plained, "the relevant question under the First Amendment-re-
gardless whether it arises as a defence in a suit for copyright
infringement or in an anticipatory challenge to a statute or regula-
tion-is whether the party has a First Amendment interest in a
copyrighted work."161
159. Id. at 375-76 (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 376.
161. Id.
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The type of argument or justification for reconciling copyright
and the First Amendment given in Harper & Row and Eldred is
more difficult to sustain when a law proposes to protect facts or
eliminates fair use. The European Database Directive of 1996 pro-
tects facts and gives very limited fair use rights, as do proposed
database laws currently before the U.S. Congress. How might they
stand up in the face of a First Amendment challenge? The scrutiny
or balancing process here will be interesting. Furthermore, Uni-
versal City Studios v. Reimerdes,16 2 concerning the operation of the
DMCA, suggests that the DMCA can act to protect facts and elimi-
nate fair use rights where a technological protection measure is in
place. 163 The DMCA does this by prohibiting actual circumvention
of an access control and by prohibiting providing, offering or other-
wise trafficking in a device that will circumvent an effective tech-
nological access or copy protection measure."1  It is no defence to
this law to argue that the circumvention has taken place in order
to make fair use of material behind the technological protection
measure or to gain access to raw data or facts behind the techno-
logical protection measure. 165
In Reimerdes, the issue of free speech was raised in the context
of the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions. The Content Scram-
bling System (CSS) was a form of encryption used to protect DVDs
from being played on unauthorised players. An authorised DVD
player, which included a computer running Microsoft Windows,
would allow the DVD to be played but not copied. In order to allow
people to speak in different digital voices, namely the Linux open
code operating system, DeCSS was released. Initially, the 2600
website made the program available from their site, but after an
interim injunction was issued they removed it from their site and
linked to other sites. Judge Kaplan held that they breached the
DMCA by providing or otherwise trafficking in a device that cir-
cumvents a technological protection measure. 166
One series of arguments in the case, which is now on appeal to
the Second Circuit, was that the DMCA was unconstitutional on
162. 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.NXY 2000).
163. Id. at 322.
164. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1), (a)(2), (b) (Supp. IV 1998).
165. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321-23; see Benkler, supra note 10, at 412-
46.
166. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
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First Amendment grounds, as it restricted the expression of the
computer code. Judge Kaplan held that while code in object or
source code can be speech for First Amendment purposes, that
does not mean it cannot be regulated. 16 7 He explained that while
the code is expressive, the behaviour it causes is functional and the
functional aspect of speech can be regulated even if it has an inci-
dental impact on the expressive aspect. 168 He explained that regu-
lation of the functional aspect of speech is content neutral, not
content specific, and therefore only requires an intermediate, as
opposed to a strict, level of scrutiny. 169 The government objective
here was to prevent large scale copyright piracy in the digital envi-
ronment-this was a legitimate objective and the scrutiny was
satisfied.
I suggest the judge understated the discursive aspect of the
functional behaviour of code. Code expressed as ls and Os is ex-
pressive, it is a literary text for copyright purposes-that much is
obvious. But the behaviour that the code causes is not just func-
tional, it is also communicative and discursive. The behaviour cre-
ated by this code allowed the people using DeCSS to talk,
communicate or consume information in differently coded speech,
namely Linux. It may be that this communicative activity can be
regulated because it could lead to unlawful activity, but that is a
question for further consideration and it may be more crucial in
other cases. We need to keep in mind that software is not just
167. Id. at 326.
Defendants' assertion that computer code is "protected" by the First
Amendment is quite understandable. Courts often have spoken of certain
categories of expression as "not within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech," so defendants naturally wish to avoid exclusion by an un-
favorable categorization of computer code. But such judicial statements
in fact are not literally true. All modes of expression are covered by the
First Amendment in the sense that the constitutionality of their "regula-
tion must be determined by reference to First Amendment doctrine and
analysis." Regulation of different categories of expression, however, is
subject to varying levels of judicial scrutiny. Thus, to say that a particular
form of expression is "protected" by the First Amendment means that the
constitutionality of any regulation of it must be measured by reference to
the First Amendment. In some circumstances, however, the phrase con-
notes also that the standard for measurement is the most exacting level
available.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
168. Id. at 327.
169. Id. at 328.
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code, it is discourse; it is not just a noun, it is also a verb. Software
allows us to see and say things in digital space. Its expressive or
discursive potential is not just in code written as static text but in
the running code, allowing and facilitating people to move and con-
sume information. Software is designed to process information-
that is its entire function-so function here is integrally linked
with communication, information and knowledge.
In Canada, there has been no success in invalidating the Copy-
right Act against the freedom of communication in Article 2 of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It has been suggested that in
Canada the idea/expression dichotomy is not sufficient to ensure
free speech, especially in the absence of a broad based fair use doc-
trine. 170 Canada, like Australia and the U.K., has a much more
limited and specific fair dealing doctrine. 171 In Australia, there
seems little doubt that the implied freedom of political communica-
tion could be invoked in a challenge to the Copyright Act in an
instance of political discourse. Short of that, free speech considera-
tions will need to be advocated through the interpretation of copy-
right law. In Grain P001,172 Judge Kirby explained:
The protection of intellectual property rights must be af-
forded in a constitutional setting which upholds other values
of public good in a representative democracy. In the United
States the relevant head of constitutional power has been
viewed as containing in-built limitations many of which are
derived from the competing constitutional objective of public
access to information. In Australia, the constitutional setting
is different but the existence of competing constitutional
objectives, express and implied, is undoubted. 173
The message from this passage is that intellectual property
rights are subject to constitutional limits; yet, can it be suggested
that fundamental democratic principles such as public access to in-
formation might act to influence the ultimate shape of copyright or
information law?
170. See Fewer, supra note 19, at 217-19. There are also issues raised by the
Canadian notion of state action, which does not easily extend to common/judge
made law and arguably non-government actors such as copyright owners.
171. Copyright Law Reform Committee, supra note 60, at Part 1, Exceptions to
the Exclusive Rights of Copyright Owners (1998) (Austl.) (suggesting that Austra-
lia adopt a U.S. styled fair use provision).
172. [2000] H.C.A. 14 (Austl.).
173. Id. at n.218.
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There is a deeper question concerning the social, as opposed to
economic, aspect of innovation in this entire debate. It revolves
around a fundamental (engineering) principle of diversity in
knowledge creation or distributed intelligence that is the hallmark
of a democratic society. The notion of "diversity" stems from the
cases of Associated Press v. United States174 and Turner Broadcast-
ing Systems Inc. v. FCC,175 where the United States Supreme
Court explained: "The basic tenet of national communication policy
is that the widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public." 176 This ethic also underpins the First Amendment. 177 A
fundamental engineering principle of social and cultural communi-
cation pathways is that of diversity-monopoly of thought will not
assist a pluralistic and tolerant society fuelled by distributed intel-
ligence. For now the challenge by the First Amendment to the
Copyright Act or the Patent Act has yet to be fully realised. This is
not to say the arguments will never prosper. The assertion of free
and open discursive frameworks that will allow diversity of opinion
is of paramount importance to any society wishing to encourage
independent thoughts and distributed (as opposed to centrally cre-
ated) intelligence.
And as digital property is much more essential to communica-
tion than real property has ever been, the cultural aspect of its
construction will continue to be highlighted. At present, though,
these arguments are not eagerly received. The more fruitful area
174. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944).
175. 512 U.S. 622, 662-64 (1994).
176. Id. at 663.
177. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its govern-
ment the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They val-
ued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the
secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without
free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, dis-
cussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination
of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert peo-
ple; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.
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for debate is in relation to the general law defining and refining
digital property.
II. THE DEFINING ASPECTS OF GENERAL (AS OPPOSED TO
CONSTITUTIONAL) STATUTORY OR COMMON LAW
While a digital property right might be constitutional pursu-
ant to the Copyright and Patent Clause or the Commerce Clause
and survive First Amendment scrutiny in the United States, Arti-
cle 2 in Canada, or the implied right to free political speech in Aus-
tralia, it will still take definition from other principles of ordinary
or general (as opposed to constitutional) law. In particular, digital
property rights must "fit"178 with other fundamental principles of
general law, some of which exhibit a constitutional-like presence in
terms of tradition and content.
Much of the specific definition of intellectual property law
comes through statutes. My aim here is not to rehash those laws
in detail but to look more at laws that limit those positive grants of
property. There are a number of principles of law that act to en-
cumber digital property rights with an obligation of "diversity."
This notion is the same as explained above in relation to free
speech. Principles of general law, like antitrust/competition, copy-
right fair use doctrine (e.g., reverse engineering of software) and
copyright misuse doctrine act to prevent extreme monopolisation
or control of informational products by any one person. These prin-
ciples of general law are dynamic in the sense that they capture
the imagination and confidence of the courts and have been much
more successful in harnessing the untold power of digital property
rights. We must look more closely at this area of law, as much of
the construction of digital property as played out in the courts is
being undertaken in this space.
These laws also make an important statement about princi-
ples in our legal system and the notion of constitutionalism. Prin-
ciples of law provide us with guidelines for regulating/mediating
an exercise of power. They come in the traditional constitutional
variety (relating to an exercise of government power: vertical con-
stitutionalism), but also in a much more "private sphere" common
law or statutory variety: horizontal constitutionalism. Examples of
178. See Burnie Port Auth. v. Gen. Jones Pty. Ltd. (1994) 179 C.L.R. 520
(Austl.); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard University Press 1986).
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the latter are common law principles such as reasonable care, un-
conscionability and unjust enrichment or statutory principles such
as antitrust and fair use/dealing. While this group of principles is
not seen as constitutional law in the strict sense, they represent
principles of constitutionalism (guidelines for regulating power re-
lations) 179 and will be increasingly important in this form of con-
ceptualization to the development of a theory of digital
constitutionalism (discussed below). In short, non-constitutional
principles of ordinary or general law as laid out in statutes or judi-
cial decisions will bring definition to digital property. The intersti-
ces of ordinary law and the Dworkinian notion of "fit" bring much
understanding to the defining process of digital property. 80
A. Antitrust/Competition Law
There is an inherent tension between IP law that creates a
form of monopoly and antitrust or competition law that monitors
the power of monopolies in the market place.' 8 ' It is becoming in-
creasingly apparent that digital property will take a significant as-
pect of its definition from antitrust law or similar doctrines like
copyright misuse, which is a defence to an action in copyright.
Antitrust or competition law, then, is the first fundamental
principle to consider. Section 2 of the Sherman Act' 8 2 provides that
a monopolist should not seek to grow or maintain'8 3 a monopoly
179. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge (Colin Gordon ed., Pantheon Books
1980) (1972).
180. See generally Maggbury Pty. Ltd. v. Hafele Australia Pty. Ltd. [20011
H.C.A. 70 (employing restraint of trade doctrine in relation to a contractual obliga-
tion concerning information).
181. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999)
(discussing the notion of copyright and patent misuse as defences to actions for
infringement rather than causes of action in themselves).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if
any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
183. In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the Supreme Court
explained that "[tihe offense of monopoly under §2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
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through anti-competitive conduct. Section 46 of the Australian
Trade Practices Act says that someone possessing substantial mar-
ket power should not take advantage of that power to lessen com-
petition, while in Europe an entity should not abuse a dominant
position in the market.1'
Understanding the scope and function of these laws depends
on understanding their purpose. There are at least two reasons for
adopting competition laws:' s5
to facilitate diversity of economic actors in the market place-
suggesting a number of small or medium players rather than
monopolies and;
to ensure economic efficiency leading to an optimisation of
consumer welfare-suggesting a market place that provides
the best economic outcomes for consumers.
The first rationale promotes diversity while the second promotes
economic efficiency, in terms of economic welfare.
Many subscribe to the view that the Sherman Act was enacted
to protect the existence of small or medium size businesses in the
face of monopolies.' 8 6 However, under the influence of the Chicago
School of Law and Economics, antitrust law is nowadays more fre-
quently conceptualized in terms of the economic efficiency of mar-
ket practices with consumer welfare as an economic issue being the
ultimate criterion.' 8 7 The economic efficiency approach at points
seems to ignore political and social aspects of the market.' 88 In
Australia, section 2 of the Trade Practices Act provides: "The object
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident." 472 U.S. 585, 596 (1985) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
184. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 46 (Austl.).
185. See David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty and Stability in Antitrust
Law, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 729, 741-64 (2001) (discussing "some of antitrust's
purposes").
186. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy 47-76 (2d ed. 1999) (argu-
ing this view is supported by more recent amendments to the Sherman Act and
public choice theory of the role of interest groups in the legislative process); George
J. Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. Legal Stud. 1, 1-8 (1985).
187. See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis
of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, 8-11, 51-57, 94-137 (2d ed. 2000)
(calling for a multi-dimensional approach, yet arguing for the primary importance
of consumer welfare over rivalry of small business-although economic theory is
said to be limited); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 15-134 (1978).
188. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F. 2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1943);
see also Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 187, at 97-115; Bork, supra note 187, at
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of this Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians through the
promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for con-
sumer protection." 189
David McGowan has recently written' 9 0 about the competing
rationales of U.S. antitrust law in light of the Microsoft'91 decision.
He ponders whether the decision is really about guaranteeing the
existence of smaller firms and competition in the market place or
whether it is about total economic efficiency analysed through pro-
ducer and consumer equations and evidenced in optimal costs and
pricing. 192 He argues that Judge Jackson in the Microsoft case
seemed to want to invoke both notions.193 He questions whether
"innovation," as invoked in antitrust reasoning, is a pursuit of
many small players in the market or the pursuit of best possible
outcomes in terms of economic welfare.' 94
So what is it that we really want from antitrust law-diversity
or optimal consumer welfare? The two are not necessarily congru-
ent. If we choose diversity as the touchstone, the exploitation of
intellectual property rights will be defined in this light and we may
see courts more willing to facilitate a broader range of access to
informational products than we would under an economic effi-
ciency approach. And if we marry a cultural theory of intellectual
property law with a cultural theory of antitrust law, we are almost
certain to see differently constructed digital property rights than if
economic theory were the motivating force.
While antitrust or competition law may be seen by many to
now rest in the lap of economic analysis, there can be little doubt
that growing proprietary rights in digital architecture, such as
software, which forms the basis of modern communication (form
and content), are demanding that a diversity of communication
pathways be opened. 195 The role of antitrust law in ensuring di-
versity of information and knowledge (in the mould of the First
50-56; Louis B. Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non Economic Goals of Antitrust,
127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1076 (1979).
189. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 46.
190. See McGowan, supra note 185.
191. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
192. See McGowan, supra note 185, at 766-76.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30; Melway Publishing Pty. Ltd. v. Rob-
ert Hicks Pty. Ltd. [20011 H.C.A. 13 (Austl.).
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Amendment) is clearly articulated in the following passage from
the Associated Press case:
The First Amendment, far from providing an argument
against application of the Sherman Act, here provides power-
ful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to
the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a
free society. Surely a command that the government itself
shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-
governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints
upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to
publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to
publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to
combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of
the press from governmental interference under the First
Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by
private interests.196
This passage, which some might suggest is outdated and others
might characterise as timeless, highlights that welfare of the pub-
lic is a social and not just an economic issue and that private corpo-
rations in their exercise of power are subject to constitutional-like
principles (another aspect of the notion of digital constitutional-
ism) of diversity rooted in antitrust law. Here lies an extremely
important point. Access and user rights to-consumption of-in-
formation and the ensuing construction of knowledge should never
be the domain of one entity, public or private. Competition law has
the potential to implement such a principle and, if it is invoked in
this manner, it will be central to the definition of digital property.
196. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). There, the dis-
trict court stated:
That interest [of the news industry to present a diversity of opinion is
closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected by the
First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to
be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of au-
thoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly: but we
have staked upon it our all.
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1. "Refusal to Deal"
One of the crucial issues that does much to define the scope of
digital property is the extent to which someone can refuse to sup-
ply their property to a particular customer. This issue is usually
much more delicate where the supplier has an intellectual prop-
erty right (copyright or patent) to enforce the refusal to supply. In
an environment where private corporations are making the high-
ways and languages of the digital world, it becomes frightening to
think they have the power to refuse entry to digital discourse.
"Refusal to deal"197 has been considered in a number of
cases.198 In essence, it means that the supplier wishes to discrimi-
nate against a particular purchaser, normally for strategic busi-
ness reasons, but also potentially for discrimination on the basis of
ideology. Generally, as a matter of contract law, we can refuse to
sell tangible property to someone so long as we do not infringe dis-
crimination laws concerning things such as race, sex and religion.
That kind of strategic business discrimination is generally seen as
part of the ethical cycle of business, and is confirmed in Melway
Publishing Pty. Ltd. v. Robert Hicks Pty. Ltd. 199 However, there is
a fine line as to when this becomes unjustifiable anti-competitive
conduct. In the United States, in cases of a continuous relation-
ship, this will be more likely to infringe. 200
The recent Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Liti-
gation201 decision highlights some of these issues. In that case,
Xerox made high volume copiers and had adopted a policy of refus-
ing to sell parts that were unique to its "Series 10" copiers to inde-
pendent service organizations ("ISOs"), including the company
CSU, unless they were also end users of such copiers. 20 2 The pol-
197. That is, the right to refuse to sell a product to someone.
198. Compare Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (stat-
ing that in terms of non-intellectual property protected products in a continuing
relationship, refusal to sell may be an antitrust violation), and Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), with Intergraph Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that a refusal to license a
patent or sell a patented item without more could not be an antitrust violation),
and In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
cf, Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that such a refusal may be an antitrust violation).
199. [2001] H.C.A. 13 (Austl.).
200. See Otter Tail Power, 410 U.S. 366; Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 585.
201. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
202. Id. at 1324.
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icy was expanded in 1987 to include all new products and the older
"Series 9" copiers.20 3 In 1989, the enforcement of the policy was
tightened, which resulted in Xerox cutting off CSU's ability to di-
rectly purchase restricted parts.20 4 Xerox "also implemented an
'on-site, end user verification' procedure to confirm that the parts
ordered by certain ISOs or their customers were actually for their
end user use."20 5 That policy was applied to CSU, one of the more
successful ISOs. 20 6
In order to keep servicing Xerox equipment, CSU: used parts
from used Xerox equipment; used parts obtained from other ISOs
and used parts purchased from customers. 207 In addition, CSU
also obtained parts from Rank Xerox, a European Xerox affiliate,
until Xerox stopped that practice.208 Xerox settled an antitrust
lawsuit with some ISOs and agreed to suspend its restrictive parts
policy and to license its diagnostic software for agreed upon peri-
ods.20 9 CSU opted out of that settlement and filed suit, alleging
that Xerox violated the Sherman Act by setting the prices on its
patented parts much higher for ISOs than for end users in an at-
tempt to force ISOs to raise prices.210 By that, the alleged violation
would then eliminate ISOs, including CSU, as competitors in the
market of high-speed copiers and printers. Xerox responded with
patent and copyright infringement counterclaims and also con-
tested CSU's antitrust claims because they relied on injuries that
they alleged were solely caused by the refusal to sell and license
patented parts and copyrighted software, which Xerox considered
lawful. 211
In dismissing the antitrust claims against Xerox, the court
explained:
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. Compare this case where Xerox said we will not sell you our parts
unless you own the machine to the scenario in Kodak where Kodak said you cannot
buy the machine unless you buy the service, which resulted in a finding of tying
under section 1 of the Sherman Act (no contract should unreasonably restrain
trade). See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451
(1992).
207. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1324.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate
the antitrust laws. "But it is also correct that the antitrust
laws do not negate the patentee's right to exclude others from
patent property."...
A patent alone does not demonstrate market power ....
The patentee's right to exclude, however, is not without
limit. As we recently observed in Glass Equipment Develop-
ment Inc. v. Besten, Inc., a patent owner who brings suit to
enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, us-
ing, or selling the claimed invention is exempt from the anti-
trust laws, even though such a suit may have an
anticompetitive effect, unless the infringement defendant
proves one of two conditions. First, he may prove that the
asserted patent was obtained through knowing and willful
fraud within the meaning of Walker Process Equipment, Inc.
v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. Or he may demonstrate
that the infringement suit was a mere sham to cover what is
actually no more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor. Here, CSU makes
no claim that Xerox obtained its patents through fraud in the
Patent and Trademark Office; the Walker Process analysis is
not implicated.
... We therefore will not inquire into his subjective moti-
vation for exerting his statutory rights, even though his re-
fusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an
anticompetitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is
not illegally extended beyond the statutory patent grant. It is
the infringement defendant and not the patentee that bears
the burden to show that one of these exceptional situations
exists and, in the absence of such proof, we will not inquire
into the patentee's motivations for asserting his statutory
right to exclude. Even in cases where the infringement de-
fendant has met this burden, which CSU has not, he must
then also prove the elements of the Sherman Act violation. 212
The court then turned to the issue of copyright, stating:
The Copyright Act expressly grants a copyright owner the ex-
clusive right to distribute the protected work by "transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." "[Tihe owner of
the copyright, if [it] pleases, may refrain from vending or li-
212. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1325-28 (citations
omitted).
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censing and content [itselfl with simply exercising the right
to exclude others from using [its] property."
The Supreme Court has made clear that the property
right granted by copyright law cannot be used with impunity
to extend power in the marketplace beyond what Congress
intended. The Court has not, however, directly addressed the
antitrust implications of a unilateral refusal to sell or license
copyrighted expression.
The Tenth Circuit has not addressed in any published
opinion the extent to which the unilateral refusal to sell or
license copyrighted expression can form the basis of a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. We are therefore left to determine
how that circuit would likely resolve the issue; the precedent
of other circuits is instructive in that consideration. The
Fourth Circuit has rejected a claim of illegal tying, supported
only by evidence of a unilateral decision to license copy-
righted diagnostic software to some but not to others. In
reaching this conclusion, the court recognized the copyright
owner's exclusive right to "sell, rent, lease, lend, or otherwise
distribute copies of a copyrighted work," and concluded that
"Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not entitle 'a purchaser
... to buy a product that the seller does not wish to offer for
sale.'"
Perhaps the most extensive analysis of the effect of a uni-
lateral refusal to license copyrighted expression was con-
ducted by the First Circuit in Data General Corp. v. Gruman
Systems Support Corp. There, the court noted that the lim-
ited copyright monopoly is based on Congress' empirical as-
sumption that the right to "exclude others from using their
works creates a system of incentives that promotes consumer
welfare in the long term by encouraging investment in the
creation of desirable artistic and functional works of expres-
sion .... We cannot require antitrust defendants to prove
and reprove the merits of this legislative assumption in every
case where a refusal to license a copyrighted work comes
under attack." The court went on to establish as a legal stan-
dard that "while exclusionary conduct can include a monopo-
list's unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an author's
desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a
presumptively valid business justification for any immediate
harm to consumers." The burden to overcome this presump-
tion was firmly placed on the antitrust plaintiff. The court
gave no weight to evidence showing knowledge that develop-
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ing a proprietary position would help to maintain a monopoly
in the service market in the face of contrary evidence of the
defendant's desire to develop state-of-the-art diagnostic
software to enhance its service and consumer benefit.
As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit adopted a modified
version of this Data General standard. Both courts agreed
that the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that "the
monopolist acquired the protection of the intellectual prop-
erty laws in an unlawful manner." The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, extended the possible means of rebutting the
presumption to include evidence that the defense and ex-
ploitation of the copyright grant was merely a pretextual bus-
iness justification to mask anticompetitive conduct .... This
is in reality a significant departure from the First Circuit's
central premise that rebutting the presumption would be an
uphill battle and would only be appropriate in those rare
cases in which imposing antitrust liability is unlikely to frus-
trate the objectives of the Copyright Act.
We believe the First Circuit's approach is more consis-
tent with both the antitrust and the copyright laws and is the
standard that would most likely be followed by the Tenth Cir-
cuit in considering the effect of Xerox's unilateral right to re-
fuse to license or sell copyrighted manuals and diagnostic
software on liability under the antitrust laws. We therefore
reject CSU's invitation to examine Xerox's subjective motiva-
tion in asserting its right to exclude under the copyright laws
for pretext, in the absence of any evidence that the copyrights
were obtained by unlawful means or were used to gain mo-
nopoly power beyond the statutory copyright granted by Con-
gress. In the absence of such definitive rebuttal evidence,
Xerox's refusal to sell or license its copyrighted works was
squarely within the rights granted by Congress to the copy-
right holder and did not constitute a violation of the antitrust
laws.213
Both of these passages highlight the delicate interplay be-
tween intellectual property law, antitrust law and the constitution-
ally enumerated grant of power. The ambit of the copyright or
patent is defined by the meaning of antitrust law, but antitrust
law is also confined by the ambit of copyright and patent. One may
refuse access to or use of an informational product or digital prop-
erty, even where someone is willing to pay market price, so long as
213. Id. at 1328-29 (citations omitted).
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one does not engage in anti-competitive conduct, The questions
then return to what anti-competitive conduct means and what is
the desired or legislated role of antitrust law.
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.214 is another case addressing
refusal to deal. In that case, Intel, a manufacturer of computer
microprocessors, supplied Intergraph, an original equipment man-
ufacturer (OEM), with microprocessors for their computer work-
stations.215 Intel saw Intergraph as a special customer and
provided Intergraph with various special benefits, including pro-
prietary information and products, under non-disclosure agree-
ments. 216 Through a series of events in November 1997,
Intergraph sued Intel for infringement of the certain patents that
it held.217 In this litigation, Intergraph also sought an injunction
to stop Intel from cutting off the supply of benefits to Inter-
graph.218 Intel opposed this motion and Intergraph amended their
claim to say that Intel was in violation of antitrust laws, basically
on the basis that it refused to deal its information to Intergraph,
even though Intergraph was suing it on other grounds for patent
infringement. 21 9 The question was, in essence, is it legitimate to
refuse to supply someone with your informational value in the face
of suit by them on other grounds?
The district court enjoined Intel from refusing to supply infor-
mation and Intel appealed, arguing that no law required it to give
such special benefits, including its trade secrets, proprietary infor-
mation, intellectual property, pre-release products, allocation of
new products and other preferences, to an entity that was suing it
on charges of multiple wrongdoings. 220
The court noted that Intergraph and Intel operated in differ-
ent markets and were not competitors. 22' While Intel might hold a
large share of the market for microprocessors, it could not be held
liable for growing its monopoly through anti-competitive conduct
by a non-competitor or consumer. 222 Intergraph also claimed that
214. 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
215. Id. at 1349.
216. Id. at 1350.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1350.
221. Id. at 1352-56.
222. Id. at 1353.
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Intel's information was an essential facility and that it should be
allowed access to it.223 The essential facility doctrine provides an
obligation to deal/supply but usually relates to core tangible infra-
structure, like railway lines or electricity wires. In the information
age there have been a number of claims that core infrastructure of
the information society is an essential facility and cannot be closed
off from use.
224
The court explained the notion of an essential facility as
follows:
The "essential facility" theory of Sherman Act violation stems
from United States v. Terminal RR Ass'n, wherein a group of
railroads formed an association that controlled the railroad
terminals, bridges, and switching yards serving the City of
St. Louis. The Court held that this association was formed
for an anticompetitive purpose, that the railroad terminals,
bridges, and yards were facilities essential to competing rail-
roads, and that section 1 of the Sherman Act was violated.
The district court found that "the Advance Chips Sam-
ples and advance design and technical information are essen-
tial products and information necessary for Intergraph to
compete in its markets." Reasoning that "[tihe antitrust laws
impose on firms controlling an essential facility the obligation
to make the facility available on non-discriminatory terms,"
the court held that Intel's action in withdrawing these bene-
fits violated the Sherman Act. As authority the district court
cited Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States and MCI Commu-
nications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
In MCI Communications, the court enumerated the ele-
ments of liability under the "essential facilities" theory as "(1)
control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competi-
tor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essen-
tial facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a
competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility."
The courts have well understood that the essential facility
theory is not an invitation to demand access to the property
or privileges of another, on pain of antitrust penalties and
223. Id. at 1356.
224. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal.
2000); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa.
1996); Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
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compulsion; thus the courts have required anticompetitive ac-
tion by a monopolist that is intended to "eliminate competi-
tion in the downstream market."225
Ultimately, the court concluded this was not an essential facility
scenario as Intel and Intergraph were not competitors and then
moved on to reject the notion that Intel had done something wrong
in refusing to supply its informational products to Intergraph:
Other than as a remedy for illegal acts, the antitrust laws do
not compel a company to do business with anyone-customer,
supplier, or competitor.
... [Ilt is well established that "in the absence of any
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] act
does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or man-
ufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal."
A "refusal to deal" may raise antitrust concerns when the
refusal is directed against competition and the purpose is to
create, maintain, or... enlarge a monopoly. For example, in
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, the only newspaper in
town refused to sell newspaper advertising to persons who
also advertised on a competing radio station; this was held to
be an attempt to... monopolize the mass dissemination of all
news and advertising, and to violate the Sherman Act.2 26
Claims of leveraging (using monopoly power to gain a competitive
advantage in another market through illegitimate conduct), coer-
cive reciprocity and tying (based on the allegation that Intel would
supply the information if Intergraph settled the law suit) were also
rejected by the court.227
Finally, the court more closely considered the issue of intellec-
tual property rights. The court explained:
In response to Intel's argument that its proprietary informa-
tion and pre-release products are subject to copyright and
patents, the district court observed that Intel's intellectual
property "does not confer upon it a privilege or immunity to
violate the antitrust laws." That is of course correct. But it is
also correct that the antitrust laws do not negate the paten-
225. Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1356-57 (citations omitted).
226. Id. at 1357-58 (citations omitted).
227. Id. at 1359-60.
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tee's right to exclude others from patent property. The patent
and antitrust laws are complementary, the patent system
serving to encourage invention and the bringing of new prod-
ucts to market by adjusting investment-based risk, and the
antitrust laws serving to foster industrial competition. The
patent and antitrust laws serve the public in different ways,
both of importance to the nation.
In Image Technical Services the Ninth Circuit reported
that it had found "no reported case in which a court had im-
posed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or li-
cense a patent or copyright." Nor have we.
... However, as we have stated, the owner of proprietary
information has no obligation to provide it, whether to a com-
petitor, customer, or supplier. Precedent makes clear that a
customer who is dependent on a manufacturer's supply of a
component can not on that ground force the producer to pro-
vide it; there must also be an anticompetitive aspect invoking
the Sherman Act.228
The message from this case is that refusal to deal or supply infor-
mation/intellectual property to a competitor or consumer is not of
itself an antitrust violation. Consumers will generally have a diffi-
cult time raising successful antitrust violations, as anti-competi-
tive conduct in competition is an important requirement. Where
the dispute involves competitors, the refusal to supply, if it
amounts to anti-competitive conduct, will raise a more serious is-
sue. This case also confirms that the essential facility doctrine will
be of limited application and will not readily provide a right to ac-
cess informational architecture. 229
228. Id. at 1362-63 (citations omitted).
229. See, e.g., Trade Practices Act, 1974, Part IIIA (AustI.); Hamersley Iron Pty.
Ltd. v. NCC [1999] F.C.A. 1370; Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. 451; Aspen Skiing,
472 U.S. 585; In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322; Intergraph
Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated by 195 F.3d 1346
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 125 F.3d
1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d
1147 (1st Cir. 1994); MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th
Cir. 1980); Hecht v. Pro-Football Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 956 (1978); see also Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in
Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ABA Antitrust L.J. 841 (1990); Allen Kezsbom &
Alan Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The Twisted Journey of the "Es-
sential Facilities" Doctrine, 1 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1 (1996); David McGowan, Regu-
lating Competition in the Information Age: Computer Software as an Essential
110 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:47
ISO and Intergraph can be contrasted with Radio Telefis Eire-
ann v. European Commission (Magill), a decision of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ).2o In Magill, due to the specific copyright
laws in place, television stations were able to claim copyright in
the listing of weekly programs in Ireland. The television stations
published their own station specific as opposed to comprehensive
weekly television guides and released daily and weekend details of
programs to daily newspapers.23' Magill attempted to publish a
comprehensive weekly television guide but was enjoined from do-
ing so on the motion of the television stations.232 Magill sought a
declaration that in refusing to licence the copyrighted material the
stations had engaged in antitrust violations or in European terms
abused their dominant position in the market place.23 3 The ECJ
agreed, opining:
In the present case, the conduct objected to is the appellants'
reliance on copyright conferred by national legislation so as to
prevent Magill-or any other undertaking having the same
intention-from publishing on a weekly basis information
(channel, day, time and title of programmes) together with
commentaries and pictures obtained independently of the
appellants.
Among the circumstances taken into account by the Court of
First Instance in concluding that such conduct was abusive
was, first, the fact that there was, according to the findings of
the Court of First Instance, no actual or potential substitute
for a weekly television guide offering information on the
programmes for the week ahead. On this point, the Court of
First Instance confirmed the Commission's finding that the
complete lists of programmes for a 24-hour period-and for a
48-hour period at weekends and before public holidays-pub-
lished in certain daily and Sunday newspapers, and the tele-
vision sections of certain magazines covering, in addition,
Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 771 (1996); W.
Greg Paciak, Essential Facilities Doctrine: Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 14
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 323 (1999).
230. See Radio Telefis Eireann v. European Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743; 4
C.M.L.R. 718 (1995); see also TRIPS, supra note 4, at art. 40; Inge Govaere, The
Use and Abuse of Intell. Prop. Rts., in E.C. Law 3-12 (1996); Irini A. Stamatoudi,
The Hidden Agenda in Magill and Its Impact on New Technologies, 1 J. World
Intell. Prop. 153 (1998).
231. Radio Telefls, 4 C.M.L.R. at para. 3.
232. Id. at para. 7.
233. Id. at para. 8.
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"highlights" of the week's programmes, were only to a limited
extent substitutable for advance information to viewers on all
the week's programmes. Only weekly television guides con-
taining comprehensive listings for the week ahead would en-
able users to decide in advance which programmes they
wished to follow and arrange their leisure activities for the
week accordingly. The Court of First Instance also estab-
lished that there was a specific, constant and regular poten-
tial demand on the part of consumers.
Thus the appellants-who were, by force of circumstance, the
only sources of the basic information on programme schedul-
ing which is the indispensable raw material for compiling a
weekly television guide-gave viewers wishing to obtain in-
formation on the choice of programmes for the week ahead no
choice but to buy the weekly guides for each station and draw
from each of them the information they needed to make
comparisons.
The appellants' refusal to provide basic information by rely-
ing on national copyright provisions thus prevented the ap-
pearance of a new product, a comprehensive weekly guide to
television programmes, which the appellants did not offer
and for which there was a potential consumer demand. Such
refusal constitutes an abuse under heading (b) of the second
paragraph of Article 86 of the Treaty.
Second, there was no justification for such refusal either in
the activity of television broadcasting or in that of publishing
television magazines.
Third, and finally, as the Court of First Instance also held,
the appellants, by their conduct, reserved to themselves the
secondary market of weekly television guides by excluding all
competition on that market since they denied access to the
basic information which is the raw material indispensable for
the compilation of such a guide.234
The case is significant because it held that the copyright owner
was not allowed to refuse to supply information, thereby making
the TV listings tantamount to an essential facility.235 This deci-
sion of the ECJ, then, provides a more robust view in the context of
information as to when it is legitimate to refuse to deal.
234. Id. at paras. 51-56 (citations and footnotes omitted).
235. Id. at paras. 76-88.
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Melway236 provides yet another perspective on this notion of
refusal to deal. Melway's, who produced a street directory for Mel-
bourne, Australian, refused to supply the respondent, a wholesaler
of motor vehicle parts and accessories, and a former authorised
distributor, supplies of directories. 237 The respondent alleged a
breach of section 46 of the Trade Practices Act, which prohibits
"taking advantage" of substantial market power to lessen competi-
tion.238 The court confirmed the relevant functional market was
the wholesale and retail market for street directories in Melbourne
and that Melway's held in 80-90% of the retail market share for
street directories. 239 Melway's, which had been marketing the di-
rectories since 1966, had developed a strategic method for distrib-
uting and selling the directories. 240 The respondent had formerly
been involved as a distributor but had that right terminated pur-
suant to the distributorship agreement.241
The majority of the Australian High Court held that Melway's
had the right to determine how to distribute their informational
product. 242 In the absence of any evidence that they had intended
to oust competitors, there was nothing wrong with what they had
done-in fact, it was simply a normal business decision.243 The
economic effect of Melway's action and ultimate consumer welfare
(from an economic sense) seemed to be in harmony. Melway's was
successful in having their action vindicated.
Judge Kirby's dissent was geared toward guaranteeing and
ensuring diversity of suppliers and access to the informational
product. He explained:
236. [2001] H.C.A. 13 (Austl.).
237. Id.
238. Id. at para. 1.
239. Id. at para. 80.
240. Id. The way they distribute could also be seen as an architectural con-
straint on the way they do business-like code-by slowing down copyists or, in
other words, implementing their copyright.
241. Id. at para. 87.
242. [2001] H.C.A. 13 at para. 80.
243. Id. at para 67. The majority explained:
But it does not follow that because a firm in fact enjoys freedom from
competitive constraint, and in fact refuses to supply a particular person,
there is a relevant connection between the freedom and the refusal. Pres-
ence of competitive constraint might be compatible with a similar refusal,
especially if it is done to secure business advantages which would exist in
a competitive environment.
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The respondent's primary submission was that, properly
analysed, Queensland Wire stands for only one relevant legal
proposition applicable to this case. This was that "take ad-
vantage of means no more than "use." In determining
whether a corporation has "takelni advantage of "its market
power for a proscribed purpose, the respondent argued that
all that was necessary was proof that, as a matter of fact, the
corporation, having such power, had refused supply for a pro-
scribed purpose. Upon this view, it was unnecessary to pose
hypothetical questions (sometimes difficult to resolve) as to
whether such corporation could or would, acting rationally,
have engaged in the forbidden conduct if it were subject to
effective competition. My own opinion is that this is correct
analysis of s 46(1) of the Act. I also consider that it is what
the decision in Queensland Wire stands for as a binding prin-
ciple of law. There is nothing in the language of the section
itself that obliges the ascertainment of an answer to a hypo-
thetical question. If, as was held in Queensland Wire, "take
advantage of" means no more than "use", that presents a
purely factual question to be answered. In short, if the sup-
plier enjoys a substantial degree of market power, the grant
or refusal of supply is necessarily, as a matter of fact, taking
advantage of (sc "using") such market power. It is doing so
because the power to grant, or refuse, supply is part of the
power substantially to control the market.
However, if I am wrong in the foregoing, it is appropriate to
consider the alternative approach on the footing that the hy-
pothetical question forms part of the rule for which Queen-
sland Wire stands. If this is done, it was certainly open to the
majority judges in the Federal Court to conclude that the im-
pugned conduct on the part of the appellant involved its tak-
ing advantage of its market power, in the sense that, acting
rationally, it would and could not (but for that power) have
acted as it did. Specifically, it would and could not have re-
fused the respondent's offer to purchase between 30,000 and
50,000 copies of the Melbourne directory each year.244
Judge Kirby's judgement is to the effect that anyone who holds
market power and refuses to supply is taking advantage of that
market power. This is very much a diversity (or non-discrimina-
tion) argument that requires the information to be dealt. It is tan-
244. Id. at paras. 109, 112.
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tamount to a right of access to information. Judge Kirby was not
just looking at economic transaction costs but also the social inno-
vation cost, remembering innovation has a social as well as an eco-
nomic aspect. The delivery of this information needs a diversity of
pathways. The monopolisation of the delivery of information to
people is not good for them-socially. To this extent, Judge Kirby
perhaps showed a social approach to competition law and the no-
tion of welfare.
Another interesting issue arises from this case. Melway's
owns an informational product in which they claimed copyright.
This case, in essence, defines the right of the copyright owner-the
right to distribute or sell the copyright product to whomever they
wish. Yet in this instance, competition law puts a gloss on this
right. In this case, we are really seeing the definitions of competi-
tion and copyright law being conflated-because the refusal to deal
is intimately connected with intellectual property rights.
In summary, the power to make someone distribute an infor-
mation product is contingent upon the power that they hold as a
digital property owner, which will, to some extent, be defined by
competition law. Refusal to deal, by itself, is not generally unlaw-
ful, but other factors (consider Magill) will raise the level of scru-
tiny; this is a difficult area in which to be confident that you will
not be liable. Judge Kirby's approach of guaranteeing a right to
deal in core informational products, a little like essential facilities
doctrine, may suggest that the time is upon us to more seriously
consider access to core informational products as part of antitrust
or competition law.
2. The Microsoft Case
The Microsoft case also highlights how intellectual property
rights in software may be questioned in light of antitrust law. This
case concerned the dominance of the Microsoft operating system,
Windows. 245 An operating system is software that allocates and
manages the hardware resources of a computer. The operating
system combined with the hardware is often called the operating
platform upon which many forms of applications (specific kinds of)
software are built. To write applications that will run on a particu-
245. When joined with the Intel microprocessor or chip this is commonly re-
ferred to as a WinTel platform.
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lar platform or operating system one needs to ensure the applica-
tion can interact with the operating system. An operating system
will be programmed to allow such interaction through what is
known as application programming interfaces (APIs). Therefore,
to write code or software that will run on an operating system you
will need to know and obey APIs. This need to write applications
for specific operating systems means that it is more difficult for a
generic application to be written that can be run on all platforms.
As Judge Jackson found, Windows was by far the most dominant
operating system in the market, with a market share in excess of
eighty percent depending on how you calculated the figures. 246
The emergence of the Internet browser and the development of
the Java programming language by Sun Microsystems opened the
way for diluting the dominance of the Windows operating system.
The browser developed with such speed and popularity that the
potential opened for people to write applications to run on the
browser platform, thereby reducing the control Microsoft had over
applications development and also threatening the continued pri-
macy of its Windows operating system. Windows would become
merely a part of the substratum that could be easily substituted if
applications software could be written to the browser platform.
Sun's programming language, Java, also allowed applications to be
written in such a way that they could be ported from one platform
to another. Both of those developments threatened Microsoft and
made it more likely for a competitor such as the open source oper-
ating system, Linux, to be more successful.
One way Microsoft took on the challenge was to build up its
market share in the internet browser area through its product, In-
ternet Explorer (IE). Its main rival in this area was the Netscape
internet browser, which showed the potential to become a domi-
nant platform upon which to write applications software. Microsoft
was also alleged to have tried to make it difficult for Java based
programs to run on Windows without modification. 247
Judge Jackson found that Microsoft breached sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act.248 They were found to have violated section
1-unreasonable contracts in restraint of trade-by tying their
browser to the operating system and ensuring through agreement
246. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
247. Id. at 43.
248. Id. at 44-45.
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with OEMs that the two were sold as a unit.249 Microsoft argued
that Windows and IE were merely one product and there was no
unlawful tying. The judge called this a form of technology tying
where software code tied the software products together.250 He
held that there was a clear market for two separate products and,
as such, this was a case of tying.2 5 1 As far as section 2 was con-
cerned, Judge Jackson found that Microsoft's actions towards Net-
scape and Sun were predacious and in breach of the Sherman
Act.2 52 As a remedy, the judge ordered that Microsoft Corporation
be broken up into an applications company and an operating sys-
tems company.253
On appeal, the judge's findings relating to tying and remedy
were questioned. 254 However, Judge Jackson's findings regarding
anti-competitive use of monopoly power were not overturned. The
matter has now been sent back to the district court for further con-
sideration, yet how the situation will be remedied remains to be
seen.
In summary, this case shows the limitations that can be im-
posed upon the owner of digital property (copyright in software) in
the face of antitrust law.
B. Fair Use
The notion of fair use in United States copyright law25 5 and
the narrower doctrine of fair dealing in UK, Canadian and Austra-
lian copyright law, defines to what extent the digital property
owner can exclude others from use of the informational product.25 6
Fair use and fair dealing allow use without the (personal) permis-
sion of the copyright owner; for this reason, some call it a privilege.
In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 25 7 and Reimerdes, fair use
arguments were unsuccessfully raised. However, there has been
more success in the area of reverse engineering of software.
249. Id. at 47.
250. See id. at 50-51.
251. Id.
252. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
253. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64-65 (D.D.C. 2000).
254. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
255. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
256. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 1659 (1988); Fitzgerald, supra note 109.
257. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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1. Reverse Engineering for Interoperability
To ensure the diversity of digital identity we must argue for
diversity in software products.258 Fundamental to software diver-
sity is the notion of interoperability, defined in the DMCA as: "the
ability of computer programs to exchange information, and of such
programs mutually to use the information, which has been
exchanged." 259
If a software engineer or developer constructs software that
becomes the industry standard, that software acts as architecture
for communication and it becomes, in essence, a platform for dis-
course. In order to develop complementary and improved software
products, in most cases, software developers will reverse engineer
the industry standard software in an attempt to make software
that can be interoperable (conversant) with the industry standard.
To be able to successfully reverse engineer software, in most in-
stances, one must copy (and in some cases "borrow" parts of) the
software, which is technically an infringement of the copyright
owner's exclusive rights over reproduction. 260
In the United States, the courts have employed the fair use
doctrine to mediate this issue,261 while more recently, Congress
has legislated on the notion of interoperability in relation to cir-
cumvention devices in the DMCA. Fair use defines the appropri-
ate balance between a monopoly right given as an incentive for
innovation and the public interest in the free flow of information
for a variety of cultural reasons.262
In Australia the Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC)263
recommended adopting a more broad-based fair use right similar
to the U.S. model in place of the existing narrower and more spe-
258. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662-64 (1994) ("The basic tenet of
national communication policy is that the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public.").
259. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(4) (Supp. IV 1998).
260. See Anne Fitzgerald & Cristina Cifuentes, Interoperability and Computer
Software Protection in Australia, 4 Computer Telecomm. L. Rev. 271, 271 (1998).
261. See generally Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that the use of copyrighted computer work to gain understanding of
unprotected functional elements was fair use of the copyrighted work).
262. See Fitzgerald, supra note 109, at 153.
263. Copyright Law Review Committee, supra note 60, at Part 1.
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cific fair dealing exceptions. 264 However, the High Court of Aus-
tralia, in the case of Data Access Corp. v. Powerflex Services Pty.
Ltd.,265 refused, in the absence of legislative direction, to endorse
the legitimacy of reversing engineering in an instance of literal
copying. 26 6 The government has since enacted a (partial) legisla-
tive solution through amendment to the Copyright Act, 1968, in
1999.267 The reproduction or adaptation of a computer program
for the purpose of obtaining information necessary to the indepen-
dent creation of a new program or a device to connect to and inter-
operate with a program or any other program is, in certain
circumstances, exempted from infringement.268
In European Union member countries, specific exceptions
have been enacted in national copyright laws,269 as required by the
1991 EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Pro-
grams. 270 Article 6 of the Directive provides that copying and ad-
aptation occurring in the decompilation of software code is
permitted where it is "indispensable to obtain the information nec-
essary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other programs."271
2. Porting to Platforms of Choice
Two recent cases highlight a more specific and immediate
challenge for the principle of fair use for interoperability in the dig-
ital environment. The challenge is to enable software applications
to be separated from and interoperable with a variety of operating
systems and associated hardware (platforms).27 2 It is in facilitat-
264. See, eg., Copyright Act, 1968, §§ 40-42 (Austl.) (discussing fair dealing for
purposes of research or study, criticism or review, and reporting news).
265. [1999] H.C.A. 49 (Austl.).
266. Id.
267. See Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Act, 1999, (Austi.); Anne
Fitzgerald & Cristina Cifuentes, Pegging Out the Boundaries of Computer
Software Copyright: The Computer Programs Act and the Digital Agenda Bill, in
Going Digital 2000: Legal Issues for E-Commerce Software and the Internet 37
(Anne Fitzgerald et al. eds., 2d ed. (2000)).
268. Copyright Act, 1968, § 47D (Austl.), amended by Copyright Amendment
(Computer Programs) Act, 1999, (Austl.).
269. See, e.g., Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, §§ 50A, 50B, 50C (UK)
(discussing acts done under statutory authority).
270. Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.
271. Id.
272. Platform is defined, in terms of computer science, as the basic technology
of a computer system's hardware and software that defines how a computer is op-
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ing this choice with respect to operating platforms (e.g, open ver-
sus proprietary) that interoperability will allow the user to speak
in their choice of differently coded/digital voices, thereby enhanc-
ing the goal of digital diversity.
In the U.S. case of Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Con-
nectix Corp.,273 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held firmly in
favour of reverse engineering274 of software in order to allow differ-
ent software products to be ported or joined (i.e., interoperate) with
different hardware, firmware or software platforms. 275 In that
case, Judge Canby, delivering the opinion of the court, explained
that the intermediate 276 copying that occurred was legitimate be-
cause it merely facilitated the copying of the unprotected (non-cop-
yright) function or idea of the software. 277 Interestingly, the
existence of a patent would have made things more difficult for
Connectix.278 However, the court clearly stated that intermediate
copying is allowable where it is used to determine function that
can facilitate the making of transformative (better or extended)
products.27 9
erated and determines what other kinds of software can be used, at http:ll
www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=platform (last visited Nov. 3, 2001). See
also Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (stating that because the operating system
supports applications while closely interacting with the PC system's hardware, the
operating system serves as a platform).
273. 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
274. See id. at 599-601.
275. See id. at 609.
276. Id. at 598-99. Intermediate copying is that which is undertaken in the
process of developing the final product which itself may not, as in the Connectix
case, be a copy.
277. Id. at 602-03. The judge remarked:
Illn the case of computer programs the idea/expression distinction poses
distinct 'unique problems' because computer programs are in essence 'util-
itarian articles - articles that accomplish tasks. As such they contain
many logical, structural and visual display elements that are dictated by
the function to be performed, by considerations of efficiency, or by exter-
nal factors such as compatibility requirements and industry demands'...
the fair use doctrine preserves public access to the ideas and functional
elements embedded in copyrighted computer software programs.
Id. at 603.
278. See Sony, 203 F.3d at 596; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of
Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1177 (2000); Richard H. Stern, Scope
of Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Business,
10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 105 (1999). It may be necessary in the
not too distant future to state the rationale more simply in terms of allowing copy-
ing on the basis of increasing portability and diversity.
279. See Sony, 203 F.3d at 602-03.
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Connectix had developed software that emulated the Sony
PlayStation on a personal computer.280 In other words, their Vir-
tual Game Station allowed consumers to play Sony games on their
personal computer and not just on the Sony PlayStation console.
This allowed portability that the court also seemed to support in
its discussion of transformative use: "The product creates a new
platform, the personal computer on which consumers can play
games designed for Sony PlayStation. This innovation affords op-
portunities for game play in new environments ... "281 The court
was not concerned with the number of intermediate copies that
had been made nor that the end product (even though containing a
different source code, yet the same function) competed with the
Sony PlayStation. 282
In contrast, Reimerdes, which was brought pursuant to the
DMCA for offering, providing or otherwise trafficking in a device
for circumventing a technological protection measure (TPM), a fif-
teen year old boy allegedly cracked the encryption code (CSS)283 of
the software lock (a technological protection measure) employed (it
was argued) to prevent easy copying of the content of Digital Ver-
satile Discs (DVDs).28 4 Judge Kaplan, in his interim and final
280. Id. at 599.
281. Id. at 606.
282. Id. at 604 (this might be termed "horizontal" interoperability); see
O'Rourke, supra note 278, at 1213, 1223.
283. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 214. The court explained that:
DVDs contain motion pictures in digital form, which presents an en-
hanced risk of unauthorized reproduction and distribution because digital
copies made from DVDs do not degrade from generation to generation.
Concerned about this risk, motion picture companies, including plaintiffs,
insisted upon the development of an access control and copy prevention
system to inhibit the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of mo-
tion pictures before they released films in the DVD format. The means
now in use, Content Scramble System or CSS, is an encryption-based se-
curity and authentication system that requires the use of appropriately
configured hardware such as a DVD player or a computer DVD drive to
decrypt, unscramble and play back, but not copy, motion pictures on
DVDs. CSS has been licensed to hundreds of DVD player manufacturers
and DVD content distributors in the United States and around the world.
Id.
284. Id. at 214 (stating that "DVDs are five-inch wide discs that, in this appli-
cation, hold full-length motion pictures. They are the latest technology for private
home viewing of recorded motion pictures. This technology drastically improves
the clarity and overall quality of a motion picture shown on a television or com-
puter screen.").
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judgement,28 5 held that the reverse engineering exception of the
DMCA 286 could not be invoked. In this case, the TPM was CSS
and the circumvention device was DeCSS. 28 7 The defendant was
alleged in the final instance to be linking to websites that allowed
the downloading of DeCSS. 28s
The defendants argued that reverse engineering of the
software lock was needed in order to play DVDs on other platforms
such as Linux.28 9 They argued that DeCSS was necessary to
achieve interoperability290 between computers running on the
Linux system and DVDs; therefore, the interoperabilty exception
in the DMCA was enlivened. The judge explained that he could not
accept such an argument for three reasons:
First, defendants have offered no evidence to support this as-
sertion. Second, even assuming that DeCSS runs under
Linux, it concededly runs under Windows-a far more widely
used operating system-as well. It therefore cannot reasona-
bly be said that DeCSS was developed "for the sole purpose"
of achieving interoperability between Linux and DVDs. Fi-
nally, and most important, the legislative history makes it
abundantly clear that Section 1201(f) permits reverse engi-
neering of copyrighted computer programs only and does not
authorize circumvention of technological systems that control
access to other copyrighted works, such as movies.291
285. See Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 217-18; Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at
319-20.
286. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
287. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 216-17. The court explained that:
CSS is a technological measure that effectively controls access to plain-
tiffs' copyrighted movies because it requires the application of information
or a process, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to
those works. Indeed, defendants conceded in their memorandum that one
cannot in the ordinary course gain access to the copyrighted works on
plaintiffs' DVDs without a "player key" issued by the DVD CCA that per-
mits unscrambling the contents of the disks. It is undisputed also that
DeCSS defeats CSS and decrypts copyrighted works without the author-
ity of the copyright owners. As there is no evidence of any commercially
significant purpose of DeCSS other than circumvention of CSS, defend-
ants' actions likely violated Section 1201(a)(2)(B).
Id.
288. See id. at 214-15.
289. See id. at 218.
290. See id. (This might be termed "vertical" interoperability); see O'Rourke,
supra note 278, at 1213, 1219-1223.
291. See Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 218.
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The defendants also made the argument that they were engaged in
a fair use under Section 107 of the Copyright Act.2 92 The judge
rejected this argument:
Section 107 of the Act provides in critical part that certain
uses of copyrighted works that otherwise would be wrongful
are "not... infringement[s] of copyright." Defendants, how-
ever, are not here sued for copyright infringement. They are
sued for offering to the public and providing technology pri-
marily designed to circumvent technological measures that
control access to copyrighted works and otherwise violating
Section 1201(a)(2) of the Act. If Congress had meant the fair
use defense to apply to such actions, it would have said so. 293
A crucial issue arising from such reasoning is whether the
DMCA creates an exclusive right in the person or entity setting the
technological protection measure to control access to copyright
works. That would allow a person or entity to protect raw data
(embodied in a copyright work) by encasing it in a TPM or to pre-
vent fair use of copyright material by encasing it in the TPM-
some suggest this is akin to locking a book or a database in a room
or bank vault.29 4 Reimerdes, while acknowledging some limita-
tions, intimates that the DMCA does create a right to control ac-
cess to copyright works and that this does not violate of the First
Amendment, as this incidental impact on protected expression is
acceptable in light of the overall objective of Congress to protect
copyright in the digital environment.295 It might be suggested that
such an approach serves to eliminate fair use, create rights in un-
protected data and portrays overly broad regulation.296 An even
more pressing point to appreciate is that fair use rights to reverse
292. See id. at 219.
293. Id.; see also Kamiel J. Koelman & Natali Helberger, Protection of Techno-
logical Measures, in Copyright and Electronic Commerce: Legal Aspects of Elec-
tronic Copyright Management (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed. 2000).
294. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy:
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 519, 538-43 (1999).
295. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23, 330; see also Council Directive
01/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright
and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, art. 6(1)
(prohibiting actual circumvention); cf Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda)
Act, 2000, (Austl.) (failing to expressly prohibit actual circumvention).
296. In considering whether such legislation should be allowed to protect non-
copyright data see Benkler, supra note 10; Patry, supra note 128; Reichman &
Samuelson, supra note 22.
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engineer software architecture in the name of interoperability,
where that software is a technological protection measure or lock,
are severely restricted by the DMCA as interpreted in this case.
One further point arising in the case and throwing light on the
meaning of the DMCA must be noted. In the process of arguing
fair use, the defendants raised the Sony defence. The judge
responded:
Defendants claim also that the possibility that DeCSS might
be used for the purpose of gaining access to copyrighted
works in order to make fair use of those works saves them
under Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. But they are
mistaken. Sony does not apply to the activities with which
defendants here are charged. Even if it did, it would not gov-
ern here. Sony involved a construction of the Copyright Act
that has been overruled by the later enactment of the DMCA
to the extent of any inconsistency between Sony and the new
statute. Sony was a suit for contributory infringement
brought against manufacturers of videocassette recorders on
the theory that the manufacturers were contributing to in-
fringing home taping of copyrighted television broadcasts.
The Supreme Court held that the manufacturers were not lia-
ble in view of the substantial numbers of copyright holders
who either had authorized or did not object to such taping by
viewers. But Sony has no application here.
When Sony was decided, the only question was whether
the manufacturers could be held liable for infringement by
those who purchased equipment from them in circumstances
in which there were many noninfringing uses for their equip-
ment. But that is not the question now before this Court.
The question here is whether the possibility of noninfringing
fair use by someone who gains access to a protected copy-
righted work through a circumvention technology distributed
by the defendants saves the defendants from liability under
Section 1201. But nothing in Section 1201 so suggests. By
prohibiting the provision of circumvention technology, the
DMCA fundamentally altered the landscape. A given device
or piece of technology might have "a substantial noninfring-
ing use, and hence be immune from attack under Sony's con-
struction of the Copyright Act-but nonetheless still be
subject to suppression under Section 1201." Indeed, Congress
explicitly noted that Section 1201 does not incorporate Sony.
... The fact that Congress elected to leave technologically
unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use of en-
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crypted copyrighted works without the technical means of do-
ing so is a matter for Congress unless Congress' decision
contravenes the Constitution, a matter to which the Court
turns below.29 7
In summary, the DMCA provides an exception for circum-
venting a TPM in order to look at a program to identify and ana-
lyse those elements necessary to achieve interoperability in the
name of reverse engineering, but only to the extent permitted by
copyright law, most commonly where a right to reverse engineer
under the fair use doctrine is available.298 Thus, the value of inter-
operability and digital diversity was seen in Reimerdes as being of
less importance than the copyright owners exclusive right to repro-
duction or to control access. This was a hard case and this type of
fact scenario needs much more thought. However, to prevent the
porting of informational products to different platforms stifles di-
versity and allows one entity to control the structure or architec-
ture for disseminating information and constructing meaning. Is
this acceptable? Obviously a very broad right to reverse engineer
given as an exception to copyright (or circumvention?) law reduces
the incentive for developing software or content. However, this
must be balanced against the need for interoperability and digital
diversity in software architecture. 299
3. Fair Use: Napster
Fair use was also unsuccessfully argued in the recent Napster
decision, although many would argue that this is a case in which
the social benefits of the user outweigh the economic arguments of
copyright protection. 30 0
There have been a number of decisions concerning what is
known as "mp3." Mp3 is a formatlsoftware that allows digitized
music to be compressed and digitally distributed without losing
297. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24.
298. See, e.g., RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 WL 127311 (W.D.
Wash. 2000); Sony Computer Entm't of Am., Inc. v. Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d
976 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
299. See Lessig, supra note 42.
300. See Fred von Lohmann, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Copyright Law Af-
ter Napster, Cal. Law., Jan. 2001, at 42, available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/
Napster/20010309_p2pexec sum.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
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sound quality.301 The recording industry throughout the world
has been greatly concerned with the proliferation of mp3 formatted
music files as this has (they say) the potential to undermine the
whole system of copyright in popular music. The technology is
such that a song can be "ripped" off a CD, uploaded to the Internet
for copying, distribution, consumption and potentially downloading
or "burning" onto a compact disc.
In many instances, the act of copying is obvious and arguably
a breach of copyright. However, lawsuits so far have not been
against the end consumer for direct copyright infringement but
against the machine or technology manufacturers or developers for
indirectly breaching copyright through facilitating infringement.
Napster involved suits by the recording industry against the com-
pany that developed and distributed software that enabled people
to reference and access mp3 files available via the Internet. A
"live" index created and centrally stored at Napster allowed online
users to share mp3 files/songs. For instance, if I want to listen to a
song called "Red River," I would use my Napster software to access
a list of people currently online from the Napster central server
who are registered as having a copy of the song; then, I would re-
quest the file directly from the person who has it stored on their
hard drive. The file is not sent to me by Napster, but by the party
who is registered as having a copy. This is sometimes referred to
301. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180
F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999).
Until recently, the Internet was of little use for the distribution of music
because the average music computer file was simply too big: the digital
information on a single compact disc of music required hundreds of com-
puter floppy discs to store, and downloading even a single song from the
Internet took hours. However, various compression algorithms (which
make an audio file "smaller" by limiting the audio bandwidth) now allow
digital audio files to be transferred more quickly and stored more effi-
ciently. MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3 (commonly known as "MP3") is the most
popular digital audio compression algorithm in use on the Internet, and
the compression it provides makes an audio file "smaller " by a factor of
twelve to one without significantly reducing sound quality. MP3's popu-
larity is due in large part to the fact that it is a standard, non-proprietary
compression algorithm freely available for use by anyone, unlike various
proprietary (and copyright-secure) competitor algorithms. Coupled with
the use of cable modems, compression algorithms like MP3 may soon al-
low an hour of music to be downloaded from the Internet to a personal
computer in just a few minutes.
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as peer-to-peer file sharing. 30 2 The important point is that Nap-
ster merely facilitates the delivery of the copied song, it does not do
any copying itself. Should they be liable for copyright infringe-
ment? Does the digital property of the copyright owner control this
situation?
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court, analogizing the
"staple article of commerce" doctrine in U.S. patent law,30 3 held
that Sony was not liable for copyright infringement for making a
video recorder because a video recorder has substantial non-copy-
right infringing uses, such as time shifting, i.e., recording material
so that you can watch it at a later date. 304 Could Napster rely on
the same Sony defence?
Ultimately, Napster was sued for copyright infringement on
the basis of contributory or vicarious copyright infringement.30 5
Before those actions could be established, the court had to deter-
mine whether there had been any direct infringement by the end
consumers. 30 6 The court concluded that there had been.30 7 The
court rejected arguments based on fair use sampling (listening to
see if they liked the music) and space shifting (location of where
one listened to the music). 30 8 The court rejected arguments based
on sampling, saying that there was evidence to show that sampling
ruined the full commercial exploitation of the songs, and on space
shifting, saying this was not like Sony in that space shifting in this
instance opened up copied product to the world.30 9
The next issue the court considered was whether there was
contributory infringement. They listed the following elements:
Did Napster know or should they have known of the infringe-
ment-actual or constructive knowledge? Yes, they knew
users were swapping infringing files;3 10
Did Napster materially contribute to the infringement? Yes,
they provided software;311
302. See Andrew Oram, Peer to Peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive
Technologies (2001).
303. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
304. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
305. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
306. Id. at 1013.
307. Id. at 1016.
308. Id. at 1018-19.
309. Id. at 1019.
310. See id. at 1020-22.
311. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
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Were there any defences? No. The court assessed the Sony
substantial non-infringing use defence, explaining that cur-
rent and future uses need to be considered, but decided the
Sony defence did not apply once knowledge was evident;3 12
Did they sell the technology knowing people would use it for
copyright infringement? In the Sony case the court said no-
in Napster, the court said yes.313
The next issue was that of vicarious infringement. The court con-
sidered the following elements:
Did Napster have authority to control or supervise infringe-
ment? Yes, because it could monitor song names; 314
Did Napster gain a direct financial benefit from infringe-
ment? Yes, because it gained more users and value through
the infringement.315
The court also stated that the Sony defence does not apply to
an action for vicarious copyright liability.316 Waiver, implied li-
cence and copyright misuse arguments were all rejected. 317 The
scope of the injunction was readjusted so that song names had to
be delivered to Napster by the record companies. 318 The court of
appeals left open the question of the application of the ISP immu-
nity provisions of the DMCA to Napster.319 Napster is now en-
gaged in a process of signing licence agreements with music
companies in the increasingly pay-per-view/hear world.
The key question arising out of this case is whether copyright
is killing technological innovation. Should the developer or inno-
vator be liable for copyright infringement in this case? What will
this do for technological innovation? This is a case of copyright
versus cultural/social/communicative experiment-should copy-
right give way a little?
Consider Sony, where it was held that a "finding of contribu-
tory infringement effectively extends the grant of power to encom-
pass the accused instrumentality-where a technology has other
312. See id. at 1020.
313. Id. at 1020-21.
314. Id. at 1023.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1022.
317. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1026-27.
318. Id. at 1027.
319. Id. at 1025.
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lawful uses such a rule would block the wheels of commerce."320 Is
innovation stifled by this decision or was this simply a clear case of
copying facilitated by a knowing intermediary? Should the digital
property owner be able to control innovation in technology that
may represent a risk to the value of that property? So far, in the
context of the new digital technologies, the answer from the courts
is likely to be "yes."
In light of the foregoing discussion it can be seen that fair use
is an extremely important variable in the definition of digital prop-
erty and will be raised in many instances, with varying degrees of
success.
C. Privacy Law
The notion of privacy means at very least the right to control
personal information/informational self-determination. 321 This
right has long been recognised in international law.322 Privacy or
data protection law promises to be a key determinant of informa-
tional property in the digital age.
While use of private information by government and public
bodies has been regulated in the United States, Canada and Aus-
tralia during the last twenty years, the flow of data in the private
sector has been subject to very little legal constraint. In 1995, the
European Union, in response to concerns over the invasive nature
of the Internet and its tremendous capacity to trace and profile in-
dividual identity, promulgated the European Directive on Data
Protection.323 In short, the Directive requires member states to
enact legislation covering the processing of data collection in the
320. Sony, 464 U.S. at 441.
321. See Lee A. Bygrave & Kamiel J. Koelman, Privacy, Data Protection and
Copyright: Their Interaction in the Context of Electronic Copyright Management
Systems, in Copyright and Electronic Commerce: Legal Aspects of Electronic Copy-
right Management 59, 64-65 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 2000); see also Moore v.
Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652 (1977); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Pri-
vacy and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373 (2000); Charles Fried, Pri-
vacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475 (1968); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383
(1960); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troub-
ling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L.
Rev. 1049 (2000); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandies, The Right to Privacy, 4
Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
322. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 13, at art. 12.
323. Council Directive 1/95, 1995 O.J. (C 93) 1.
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private sector.324 The purpose for which the information was gath-
ered must be disclosed at the point of receipt, and the information
may only be used for that purpose.3 25 Individuals have the right to
see data on themselves, yet full and informed consent by the data
subject may be used to override many of the obligations imposed by
the Directive.3 26 Most importantly, Article 25 of the EU Directive
stipulates that EU businesses cannot disclose data to members of
third party states unless it is shown that effective data protection
regimes are in place in those states. In April 2000 Canada re-
sponded by enacting similar obligations in the Privacy and Elec-
tronic Documents Act.327 Likewise, in December 2000 Australia
enacted the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act.328 In the
United States, legislation has been avoided. In its place, the
United States Department of Commerce has promulgated safe har-
bour rules, which act as an optional self-regulatory structure. The
efficacy of such a regime is still in question.
In the United States, state constitutional law and other forms
of specific state privacy legislation 329 may also be relevant in some
cases, e.g., Californian Constitution Article 1, Section (1): "All peo-
ple are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."330 Through this provi-
sion, "California accords privacy the constitutional status of an in-
alienable right on a par with defending life and possessing
property."331 "Privacy is protected not merely against state action;
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. See id.; see also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
art. 8 (reinforcing this idea).
327. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C., ch. 5
(2000) (Can.).
328. Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act, 2000, no. 155 (Austl.).
329. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1749.60 (Supermarket Club Card Legislation)
(2001), 1708.7 (Cyberstalking) (2001); Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent
Transportation Technology, 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 151, 189-
202 (1995).
330. Cal. Const. art. 1, § 1.
331. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990).
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it is considered an inalienable right that may not be violated by
anyone."332
More recently, litigation in the United States against the ban-
ner advertisement company DoubleClick addressed the legality of
"cookies" (technology that allows the viewing habits of your com-
puter to be traced).333 The legal arguments made pursuant to fed-
eral law, which were based on the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, Wire Tapping Act, and the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, against DoubleClick were dismissed.334 The more in-
teresting state law claims concerning the privacy tort,33 5 unjust
enrichment and possibly trespass to chattels were not dealt with
by the federal court. It remains to be seen whether the privacy tort
(intrusion upon seclusion) can successfully be argued in a case in-
volving cookie technology. And when that happens, courts will
have to ask: Would it be illegal for someone to follow you around in
real space and note your buying habits? 336 Have you put yourself
in public view by logging onto the network? There may also be a
First Amendment challenge against such state based privacy tort,
unjust enrichment and trespass actions.337
Increasingly, privacy regimes for the private sector will regu-
late the way in which private data can be exploited in the market
place. The message to be taken from the European Directive is
that you should not collect private information unless you need to,
but if you must then explain the purpose, collect it in a fair way,
allow access to it by the data subject and gain their consent for
using it in secondary ways. Surreptitious or covert ways of collect-
ing information should not be encouraged; however if the informa-
332. Porten v. Univ. of S.F., 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (cita-
tions omitted).
333. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
334. See id.
335. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652 (1997).
336. See generally Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970)
(holding that mere information gathering about a particular person does not give
rise to action for invasion of privacy where information is open to the public and
voluntarily given).
337. See Volokh, supra note 321; U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th
Cir. 1999); see generally Jennifer Barrett et al., Data Privacy Laws and the First
Amendment: A Conflict, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1 (2000) (dis-
cussing First Amendment and data protection issues); Solveig Singleton, Privacy
Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Me-
dia & Ent. L.J. 97 (2000) (discussing same).
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tion can be collected without identifying the subject then the law
will usually not be breached.338 Although, in those cases where
the manner of collection allows fairly precise identification, even
without a name, such collection will not be allowed.
An interesting question that arose in the DoubleClick case and
that is allied to the notion of database rights is whether the data
subject has a right to claim payment for the data that has been
collected and is being exploited. There, the court explained:
Plaintiffs also contend that they have suffered economic dam-
ages consisting of the value of: (1) the opportunity to present
plaintiffs with advertising; and (2) the demographic informa-
tion DoubleClick has collected. Essentially, they argue that
because companies pay DoubleClick for plaintiffs' attention
(to advertisements) and demographic information, the value
of these services must, in some part, have rightfully belonged
to plaintiffs. They point to AOL in which the court appeared
to hold that damage to "reputation and goodwill" counted to-
wards the damage threshold and argue that, by the same
logic, the economic value of their attention and demographic
information should count as well.
Even assuming that the economic value of plaintiffs' attention
and demographic information could be counted towards the mone-
tary threshold-a dubious assumption-it would still be insuffi-
cient. We do not commonly believe that the economic value of our
attention is unjustly taken from us when we choose to watch a tele-
vision show or read a newspaper with advertisements and we are
unaware of any statute or caselaw that holds it is. We see no rea-
son why Website advertising should be treated any differently. A
person who chooses to visit a Web page and is confronted by a
targeted advertisement is no more deprived of his attention's eco-
nomic value than are his off-line peers. Similarly, although demo-
graphic information is valued highly (as DoubleClick undoubtedly
believed when it paid over one billion dollars for Abacus), the value
of its collection has never been considered a economic loss to the
subject. Demographic information is constantly collected on all
338. See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (noting "'per-
sonal data' shall mean any information relating to an identified or unidentifiable
natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to
one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cul-
tural or social identity").
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consumers by marketers, mail-order catalogues and retailers.
However, we are unaware of any court that has held the value of
this collected information constitutes damage to consumers or un-
just enrichment to collectors. 339
While the court was apprehensive about recognising this per-
sonal claim for the value of the private data, some academics have
gone as far as suggesting that people should be recognised in law
as possessing a property (intellectual property?) right in their per-
sonal information.3 40 This would allow people to protect such in-
formation through law and to charge for it in the market place.
Samuelson has cautioned against such an approach, arguing that
it would distort the rationale for having property rights in informa-
tion, which could lead to higher transaction costs and a worsened
situation for the data subject.341 She prefers a form of licensing
that licenses private information along the same lines as trade se-
cret licensing, where one contractually structures the usage rights
of the information before disclosure.3 42
It can be seen from this brief analysis that the growing law on
privacy or data protection, especially in the private sector, will
have a significant impact upon the shape and content of digital
property rights.
IV. CONTRACTUALLY DEFINED DIGITAL PROPERTY
The contract, an agreement between two or more parties, is
the foundation of many privately ordered relationships and is in-
creasingly being used to regulate informational property entitle-
ments in the digital environment.
A. Contractually Created Informational Property Rights
Contractual rights can be used to extend public or legislative
rights to informational value, especially in the area of data capi-
tal.343 While there may be no recognised legislative intellectual
339. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (footnotes and citations omitted);
see also Weld v. CVS Pharmacy Inc., 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 217 (Mass. Super. 1999).
340. See Cohen, supra note 321; see also Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/
Information Property, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1283 (2000).
341. See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 Stan. L. Rev.
1125 (2000).
342. See id.
343. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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property right in data, a contract can be used to regulate the way
in which people use information that has been collected to create
contractual or privately ordered informational property rights.
The limit of a contract (besides some complex constitutional issues)
is that it is only enforceable against the parties to the contract and
not the world at large. For instance, if I buy a licence to use data
that contains restrictions on my further copying, selling or exploit-
ing the data, that licence will not bind a stranger who copied the
data.
B. Contractual Licensing
Contract is also very important to the broader issue of infor-
mation licensing.344 In the information economy informational
products are usually licensed and not sold; the license is the prod-
uct. In most instances you do not receive an ownership right to
anything but rather a right to use information. In real space,
when I buy a book I do not obtain ownership of the copyright
owner's right to reproduce the book, but I do gain ownership of the
physical thing called the book. With informational products, such
as software games and digital images, you are usually only given a
licence to use the information for specific purposes, and to this end,
you must read the licence closely to determine your user rights. In
essence, the contractual licence determines "exploitation" and
"user" rights in information and in this way contract is used as a
mechanism for defining digital property.
C. Formation of Contractual Licences
An issue vitally important to this contractual definition of dig-
ital property is the way in which contractual licences are formed.
In order to determine informational rights, it is important to know
whether a contract is in existence and upon what terms. This
question has been raised in the context of shrink-wrap and click-
344. See Gail E. Evans & Brian F. Fitzgerald, Information Transactions Under
UCC Article 2B: The Ascendancy Of Freedom of Contract in the Digital Millen-
nium, 21 U. New S. Wales L.J. 404 (1998), available at http:ll
www.law.unsw.edu.au/pub-lications/journals/unswlj/ecommerce/evans.html; Rob-
ert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is The Product. Comments on the Promise of
Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 891
(1998); David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 Cal.
L. Rev. 17 (1999). Licenses are contracts that define user rights in relation to in-
formation products.
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wrap/click-through contracts. "Shrink-wrap contracts" are nor-
mally used where the product, e.g., software, is sold in a store. The
terms of the contract are shrink-wrapped around the product in
fine print and in most instances not fully disclosed until after open-
ing the package. "Click-wrap or click-through contracts" are nor-
mally employed in an online environment, such as the Internet,
and may, at best, involve the acceptance of the terms of the con-
tract by clicking on a digital icon denoting consent after having
been shown the terms. In some click-wrap cases, which are highly
questionable from a legal perspective, terms are not clearly dis-
played prior to the buyer entering into the agreement. In the re-
cent decision of Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp and
AOL, 345 a third type of situation called "browse-wrap" was out-
lined. A browse-wrap scenario arises where the Internet consumer
is not required to negotiate an "I agree" button or icon or view the
licence terms before gaining access to the product. Instead, the
terms are located behind a button/icon on the website that the con-
sumer is not forced to view or engage. In Specht, the court held
that the browse-wrap scenario would not usually give rise to a
valid contract.346
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,347 the court held that shrink-
wrap, and arguably click-wrap, licences are enforceable in certain
circumstances. 348 ProCD developed a product known as Select
Phone (the compilation of over 3000 telephone directories on CD),
which was sold in stores for $150. 34 9 ProCD invested over $10 mil-
lion in developing this product.350 Mindful of the Feist decision
and the inability of copyright law to protect raw data, ProCD
sought to commodify informational value through a contractual
agreement.35 1 Shrink-wrapped around the CD in plastic or cello-
phane was a detailed user agreement or licence, which contained a
term stipulating that the application program or information
345. 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
346. See id. at 594.
347. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
348. Id. at 1449; see, e.g., Register.com v. Verio Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d. 1020 (N.D.
Cal. 1998); Lemley et al., Software and Internet Law 494-95 (2000); see also Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808
(1997); Natl Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
349. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
350. Id.
351. Id.
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should not be on sold for commercial purposes. 352 Zeidenberg al-
legedly purchased the CD, went home and loaded it onto a website
where it was sold at a price less than that charged by ProCD.3 53
He was sued for breach of contract and argued that nothing in the
contract prevented him from selling the information. 354 He argued
that, at the point of purchase, it was impossible to read all the
terms of the shrink-wrapped licence; therefore, he had no adequate
notice of those terms and was not bound by them.355 The court
held that the economics of the new information economy suggested
that he should be bound by the shrink-wrapped terms and further-
more, if he did not like them, he could have taken the CD back, but
by acquiescing and choosing to keep and use the informational
product he was bound by the terms.35 6 While many have ques-
tioned whether this reasoning is fair, it is now embodied in sec-
tions 208 and 209 of UCITA, under the umbrella of layered
contracting.357
Judge Easterbrook rejected the argument that the contractual
licence was preempted by section 301(a) of the U.S. Copyright Act.
The argument was that creating copyright-like rights in data, the
contractual user agreement was in contravention of section 301 of
the Copyright Act, which preempts states from legislating on the
issue of copyright.358 Judge Easterbrook held that contractual in-
formation rights and legislated copyrights were fundamentally dif-
ferent. 359 He explained that contract is a mechanism for private
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1450.
354. Id. at 1450-52.
355. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450-51.
356. See id.
357. UCITA is a model law promulgated for adoption by the United States that
creates a "sale of goods" styled regime for the licensing of software and other infor-
mational transactions. It is argued that the process of transacting software and
other informational products is not adequately covered by existing sale of goods
type legislation, which finds it hard to classify software. In the case law software
is sometimes classified as a good and sometimes as a service; leading commenta-
tors to label software the digital chameleon. UCITA aims to avoid this debate by
creating a sui generis regime governing the formation, performance and termina-
tion of information transactions. It has been highly controversial in its content
and has only been adopted by two U.S. states: Maryland and Virginia. Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act, available at http:/www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/ucita/ucita0l.htm.
358. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453.
359. Id. at 1454.
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ordering that applies only between the parties to the contract
whereas the Copyright Act is public legislation that applies to the
world at large.3 60
Some critics have said that non-negotiated mass market
licences are much more like legislation than contract and should be
closely scrutinised in terms of preemption.3 61 Lemley suggests
that the weight of the ProCD decision should not be overstated as
it goes against the majority of judicial opinion on the issue.3 62 In
Australia, the courts have yet to explicitly determine the legal va-
lidity of shrink-wrap and click-wrap contracts. Such contracts will
inevitably be challenged, as in the United States, on the basis that
they do not adequately disclose the terms of the contract prior to
the entering of the agreement.36 3 The issue of the formation of
contractual licences will continue to be important to the complex-
ion and definition of digital property because knowing whether a
contract exists, and upon what terms, is intimately connected to
informational exploitation and user rights.
D. Contractual Allocation of Domain Names
Contract has been even more prominent in the area of domain
name allocation. Allocation of the premium Internet commercial
trading domain ".com" is now performed through a contractual
regime created under the auspices of the Internet Corporation
360. Id.
361. See Dennis S. Kaijala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line
Licenses, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 511 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Pre-emption:
The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111 (1999);
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-
Based Approach, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 53 (1997); David A. Rice, Public Goods,
Private Contract, and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License
Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 543 (1992).
362. See Mark A. Lemley, Software and Internet Law 490-93 (2000).
363. See Mark Sneddon, Legal Liability and E-Transactions 33-34 (2000),
available at http ://www. noie. gov. au/publications/NOIE/NEAC/publicationutz
1508.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2001); see generally Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking
Ltd., 2 Q.B. 163 (1970) (holding in a case regarding contract printed on parking lot
ticket that since plaintiff did not know of the exemption condition and the defend-
ants had not done what was reasonably sufficient to bring it to his notice, it did not
except them from liability); Balmain New Ferry Co. v. Robertson (1906) 4 C.L.R.
379 (Austl.) (holding that notice posted above wharf entrance was sufficient to
show implied agreement to terms).
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for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)364 requiring arbitra-
tion.365
The recent string of personality cases concerning Julia-
Roberts.com, Sting.com and Madonna.com are interesting exam-
ples.366 Enterprising business people moved in early and
registered those domains. The famous stars behind the names
wanted them and sought to invoke the ICANN dispute resolution
policy, which involves compulsory arbitration. At the time of regis-
tration, the domain name registrants contractually bind them-
selves, in the instance of a dispute, to enter arbitration and abide
by the decision. If the registrant is found to have registered and
used the domain name in bad faith, vis-a-vis a trademark, they
stand to lose that registration. Julia Roberts and Madonna were
successful in showing the necessary elements, including that they
possessed a trademark, while Sting, due to the generic nature of
the word and other difficulties, did not possess the requisite
trademark.
This system is in line for an overhaul as the legitimacy, consis-
tency and accountability of the process is in question.367 Neverthe-
less, let me make some observations. The ICANN system of
resolving domain name disputes, which has dealt with in excess of
3000 cases since the beginning of the year 2000, has sought to pro-
tect informational value through contractually agreed principles.
To date, the majority of the decisions have favoured the traditional
trademark holder and not the domain name speculator. Domain
name speculation has been treated like a case of the theft of the
investment value of the trademark.3 68 The speculator has rarely
364. ICANN is available at http://www.icann.org.
365. ICANN: Uniform Domain Names Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), art.
4, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last visited Nov. 10,
2001).
366. These decisions are available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
index.html.
367. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using
ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 Duke L.J. 17 (2000)
(arguing that the use of ICANN to regulate in the stead of an executive agency
violates fmdamental values and policies designed to ensure democratic control
over the use of government power, and sets a precedent that risks being expanded
into other regulatory activities).
368. See Brian F. Fitzgerald & Emma Sheehan, Trademark Dilution and the
Commodification of Information: Understanding the 'Cultural Command', 3 Mac-
arthur L. Rev. 61 (1999) (Austl.).
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been regarded as deserving of reward. Perhaps there should be
arguments for value on both sides, but this value is difficult to ap-
portion. For good or bad, what this system shows very clearly is a
contractual regime being used to ensure informational value is
realised as wealth.
Recently, Parisi v Net Learning Inc.,369 held that Uniform Do-
main Names Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) determinations
are not arbitrations for the purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act
and thereby do not prevent access or review in the courts, explain-
ing that "[allthough ICANN exerts quasi-governmental sway over
the growth and administration of the Internet, the UDRP is en-
forced through contract rather than regulation."370
To ease the pressure on the .com domain, to add greater speci-
ficity and to reduce disputes over domain names, ICANN has ap-
proved the allocation of seven new generic top level domains
(TLDs): .aero, .biz, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, and .pro.371 The
interesting question is how these domains will be contractually al-
located. Will trademark holders be given priority and, if so, which
trademark holders will gain priority? Will existing .com regis-
trants have the ability to block others registering in these
domains?
The first to be allocated will be .biz and .info. According to the
ICANN press release, .info will be an unrestricted TLD, open to
any business or person to register for any purpose, while .biz will
be a restricted TLD, open only for commercial or business pur-
poses.372 In November 2000, registry operators NeuLevel (.biz)
and Afilias (.info) were among seven registry operators for new
TLDs selected by the ICANN Board of Directors following an open
process for submission of proposals. Agreements with the opera-
tors of .aero, .coop, .museum, .name, and .pro are in the process of
being completed.
To provide for a stable, fair, and orderly introduction of the
new TLDs, NeuLevel and Afilias will employ different three-step
approaches to launch their registry services:
NeuLevel (.biz):
369. 139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001).
370. Id. at 747.
371. See Announcements, at http://www.icann.orglannouncements/icann-
prl5may0l.htms (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
372. Id.
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1. Intellectual Property Claim Service. Beginning in
late May through the beginning of July, .biz will offer a fee-
based service for businesses to submit trademark claims
before the application process is opened. Under this service,
domain-name applicants will be notified of a trademark
owner's claim when they submit an application for a claimed
name and, if they decide to go ahead with the registration,
the business submitting the claim will be notified of the regis-
tration and will be given a window of opportunity to challenge
the registration using an administrative dispute resolution
procedure.
2. Domain Name Application and Selection. Beginning
in July through late September, .biz will open the application
process for businesses. Businesses will submit their applica-
tions through registrars; these applications will be randomly
selected in batches and awarded. Businesses can submit an
unlimited number of applications but there will be a $2.00 fee
for each application for a .biz name.
3. .biz Begins Operations. In October, .biz names that
have been awarded will become operational. .biz will use a
Restriction Dispute Resolution Process (RDRP) similar to the
ICANN UDRP process to resolve challenges related to the
business-only restricted nature of the registry. 373
Afilias (.info):
1. Sunrise Period. Beginning in late June and ending
in late July, Afilias will offer a 30 day "sunrise" period during
which anyone with a registered national trademark can apply
through a registrar for a .info domain name corresponding to
the trademark. Trademark data will be provided at the time
of application and the term of the domain name registration
will be for at least 5 years. To assure fair and equal access
during the sunrise period, registrars will first collect applica-
tions and deliver them to Afilias. Afilias will then implement
a multi-round batch processing system in which it will ran-
domly select applications from each registrar's batch. The
World Intellectual Property Association (WIPO) will adminis-
ter a challenge procedure through which any third party may
challenge these sunrise period registrations to ensure that
they comply with the applicable requirements. This challenge
process will be available for approximately 120 days after
373. Id.
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Afilias begins accepting applications for .info domain names
from the general public, ending in November.
2. Domain Name Application and Registration. Within
15 days after the conclusion of the sunrise period, Afilias will
begin accepting applications for .info domain names from the
general public. To ensure that ordinary Internet users have
an equal chance to register names during the initial launch
phase, .info names will be registered using a multi-round
batch process similar to the one used for sunrise period appli-
cations. Using this process, Afilias will randomly select ap-
plications from batches submitted by each registrar. This
process is an alternative to a pure first-come-first-served sys-
tem which could operate to the unfair advantage of those
with mechanized registration scripts. This batch process will
last approximately three weeks, after which Afilias will pro-
cess applications on a real-time basis.
3. .info Begins Operations. Names awarded during the
sunrise period will become operational one week after the be-
ginning of the general application and registration process.
The remainder of the awarded info names will become opera-
tional promptly after Afilias processes them.3 7 4
These policies are contractual in nature and already there has
been concern over their implementation; NeuLevel was reportedly
threatened with legal action over the random allocation of .biz in
the face of competing trademark holders. Such a challenge will
call into question the power of this new contractually based infor-
mational property regime to effectively operate. In this type of
challenge, the power of contract to allocate "some" of the value of
digital property created under statute will be closely considered.
This may, in turn, lead parties to further contemplate the values or
policies upon which the contractual regime is founded.
Overall, let me make this simple point. Contract is a vital
strategy in creating and defining digital property.
V. TECHNOLOGICALLY DEFINED DIGITAL PROPERTY
More and more, technology is being used as a means of regu-
lating our behaviour in relation to informational products. In his
seminal book, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, 37 5 Stanford
University law professor Larry Lessig highlights how the digital
374. Id.
375. Lessig, supra note 42.
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environment is not a given, but rather a construction of code writ-
ers. The "nature" we inhabit in the digital world is one constructed
through technology and technologists. In Lessig's theory, there are
four modalities of regulation: customary norms; the market; law;
and architecture. If I want to stop someone from speeding, I can
employ the four modalities of regulation by encouraging a custom-
ary norm that speeding is bad through: advertising; raising the
price of petrol; enacting a law to say speeding is an offence; and
building a restraining architecture such as a mechanical limit in
the car or speed bumps. It is as simple as speed bumps. Just as
architecture in real space can constrain our action, Lessig explains
architecture in the digital world (code) can regulate what we do.
Therefore, instead of relying solely on law (e.g., copyright law)
to protect my informational value (e.g., software), I should consider
what technological mechanisms are available to regulate access
and use of my informational product. The big players have already
begun this process and we will hear more and more about the role
encryption will serve in the distribution of digital entertainment
informational products through a framework of digital rights man-
agement. And while many advocate that technological restraints
need to be principled and give balanced access to the public-in the
way copyright legislation does-the legislatures have enacted laws
like the DMCA in the United States and the Copyright Amend-
ment (Digital Agenda) Act in Australia that serve to buttress tech-
nological constraints by making it a crime to deal in or provide
devices that circumvent technological protection measures. These
types of laws, combined with code, will make technological protec-
tion measures crucial in the new environment.
For example, the latest version of a popular software product
contains technological or coded restraints that make it very diffi-
cult to copy and load the software on to a second machine. This
technological constraint is designed to enforce copyright in the
software. Likewise, DVDs are distributed with anti-copying CSS
encryption, which will only allow them to be accessed through an
authorised player. Some fear that coded restraints could become a
law unto themselves and slant protection too far in favour of the
property holder.
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The Reimerdes case highlights the notion of "code as law."
3 76
The thrust of Lessig's argument, in contrast to that of early digital
libertarians, was that governments should regulate cyberspace to
counteract the negative effects of code. 3 7 7 He argued that the pub-
lic values inserted into everyday life by legislation and the common
law (for example the fair use doctrine in copyright law), were at
risk in a code based world where private corporations regulated
activity according to their private values.37 8 The world of code
needed to be infused with public values through law. The DMCA,
in essence, does the opposite, in that it is a law that has been en-
acted to preserve the power of the code by prohibiting people from
breaking through or cracking code. In Lessig's schema, there
should now be another law that sits on top of the DMCA that in-
serts values into the system.
Imagine a world where an informational product can be dis-
tributed to the consumer in a way that copying of and access to the
informational product can be severely restricted. Imagine a world
in which chapters of a book can be downloaded or streamed, but
not printed or copied. In this type of scenario, or "pay-per-view"
world, encryption will be used as the technological mechanism for
limiting use of informational products. A large number of people
are concerned that such a state of affairs would lead to the demise
of our current fair use rights to copy a chapter of a book or to read a
book in a library. It could be argued that we should jettison fair
use rights and reconceptualize the way public interest will be
served in a world of code. Perhaps things might work better with-
out fair use and that holding on to such a principle in the digital/
crypto world is conservative and dated. However, I am yet to be
convinced that I am a dinosaur, or that the demise of fair use is a
good thing.
How do we ensure the code world and its digital property will
espouse public values of user and access? The answer to this ques-
tion requires us to determine the source and location of values in-
herent to digital property and their continued relevance and
enforceability.
376. See id.
377. See id.
378. See id.
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VI. THE VALUES DEFINING DIGITAL PROPERTY:
DIGITAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
As we have seen to this point, digital property takes definition
from legislation, contract and technology. The Constitution, as a
foundational document bringing fairness to the exercise of power,
acts as an overlay. However, U.S. constitutional law and its funda-
mental values, such as free speech and equality, are only operative
where there is evidence of state action: legislative, administrative
or judicial. 379 Therefore, U.S. constitutional law will have limited
application in the privatised world of code, where private technol-
ogy corporations build self-executing digital architecture embed-
ded/coded with corporate, not public values. The doctrine of state
action, which perpetuates the public/private divide, is a crucial is-
sue to understand. Some suggest its enduring nature in U.S. con-
stitutional law comes from the notion of laissez faire-the idea that
people like to think their private actions are regulated by little
more than the market.380 Whatever its rationale, the notion of
state action means that, in many cases, values inherent in public
constitutionalism will have limited impact in the digital world.
This challenges us to conceptualise a notion of digital constitution-
alism wherein public values are implemented. As this section will
highlight, the notion of digital constitutionalism, which seeks to
implement a principled allocation of power/rights over information,
will combine aspects of public constitutionalism, statutory and
common law adjudication and perhaps new legislation in relation
to technology/code.
Where digital property rights are founded on legislative action
pursuant to the IP clause, then constitutional values inherent in
that clause, as well as notions such as free speech, will need to be
379. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1711 (2d ed.
1988); see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1975) (holding that picketers did
not have a First Amendment right to enter the shopping center for the purpose of
advertising their strike against their employer); Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (holding that a
shopping center which serves as a community business block was the functional
equivalent of a business block for First Amendment purposes); Andrew Clapham,
Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994).
380. Paul S. Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural
Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to "Private" Regulation, 71 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 1263, 1288 (2000).
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weighed in the balance. Furthermore, general law principles of ac-
cess and user rights, as evidenced by fair use doctrine and anti-
trust law, will provide definition to any legislated digital property
right. I have argued above that legal principles such as antitrust
and fair use have the potential to implement/guarantee a diversity
ethic in the digital environment.
For digital property rights constructed or extended through
contract, the role of constitutionally entrenched rights and values
will be more remote. If the contract is simply building on legisla-
tive rights, then the constitutional issues will be relevant to that
aspect, but what of the situation where contract purports to create
digital property rights, e.g., in the case of raw data. First would
come the question of whether this conflicts with the Constitution
or legislation, such as section 301 of the Copyright Act; this might
require further consideration as to whether it is a negotiated or
mass market licence, the latter being more like conflicting legisla-
tive action. 38l However, assuming we take the view enunciated in
ProCD that such a contractual process is lawful, then we are left to
find values in the field of contract law. A vigorous notion of uncon-
scionability developed to address the specific needs of information
contracts might provide a way of ensuring that access and user
rights are maintained. However, if contract is tied with technology
and the contract is self-executing through technology-meaning
access to data is denied if copying for fair use occurs-then enforce-
ment of such a principle will require the user to litigate and en-
force an emerging principle of unknown quality, i.e., informational
unconscionability. 38 2 The potential of self-executing contracts
would also mean that state action would be hard to establish
against the property holder and therefore issues such as free
speech would not easily be raised.
381. Custom or negotiated software licences are much more specific and con-
tractual in nature. Mass market or non-negotiated licences, on the other hand,
often act like a multilateral treaty or legislation to guarantee a uniform custom
amongst all users. Some argue the latter are being preempted due to their legisla-
tive-like character while the former are more contractual in nature and therefore
not preempted.
382. See J.H. Reichman & Jonathon A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellec-
tual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of
Information, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 875 (1999).
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A further question concerns the extent to which contract can
be used to oust fair use rights bestowed by the Copyright Act.383
Does contract have the power to define digital property by remov-
ing access and user rights granted by the Copyright Act to engage
in reverse engineering of software for interoperability purposes?
This issue is hotly contested by different interest groups; however,
if contract does have this capacity, then it becomes a most impor-
tant strategy in defining digital property rights. Another issue will
be the extent to which contract is limited by antitrust doctrine
through its definition of digital property.
Furthermore, can contract oust the first sale doctrine? The
first sale doctrine, expressed in section 109 of the U.S. Copyright
Act 384 and implied in Australian copyright law, 385 allows the copy-
right owner to control distribution of the tangible embodiment of
copyright up to the point of first sale. For example, if I buy a book,
I gain an ownership right to the book and can sell it but not
reproduce it, unless I have a fair use/fair dealing right. I gain own-
ership of the tangible book and thereby reduce the power of the
copyright owner, but I do not gain ownership of the remaining ex-
clusive rights of the copyright owners such as the reproduction
right. First sale is an important distributive principle and to some
extent software licensing challenges this distributive mechanism.
Software is generally licensed, not sold, as is an ever increasing
variety of information products. We are sold access or user rights
to information rather than tangible ownership rights. This is done
through a contractual user agreement/licence, which stipulates the
user rights of consumers. The contractual licence allows greater
383. See UCITA § 105 (1999); Brian F. Fitzgerald, Commodifying and Trans-
acting Informational Products Through Contractual Licences: The Challenge for
Informational Constitutionalism, in Intellectual Property and the Common Law
World 35 (Charles E.F. Rickett & Graeme W. Austin eds., 2000).
384. See also 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copy-
right, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work
is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the
copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself con-
vey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the
absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of
any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any ma-
terial object.
Id.
385. See Pacific Film Labs. Pty. Ltd. v. Fed. Comm'r of Taxation (1970) 121
C.L.R. 154 (Austl.).
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control over the exploitation of the informational product. On one
hand, it could be that contract cannot be used to override such a
fundamental principle of copyright law. Informational products
are either sold or leased. In DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse
Communications, Inc.,38 6 the court suggested that contract can be
used to oust first sale.38 7
Lastly, there is technologically created property. Once again,
code has the power to define and enforce, through self-execution,
access and user rights in accordance with the values of the private
corporation setting the code. In this situation, the Constitution is
unlikely to provide the values as there is no state actor, and in
many cases, no need to use a court for enforcement purposes. How-
ever, if contract is intertwined with the coded distribution of infor-
mation, there may be points at which constitutional or general law
values can be argued. In the absence of applicable constitutional
doctrine, statutory law or common law, technology will be used to
construct property rights in the vision of the private corporation.
This is the point at which Lessig suggests we need to legislate for
digital constitutional values. Likewise, Berman has suggested
that we need to invoke principles of public constitutionalism in dis-
putes emanating from the private sphere.388
It is worth citing two examples to give further insight on these
issues. There is the case where a large ISP blocks out unsolicited
e-mail sent by a marketing firm (spam), who then argues that such
action is an infringement on free speech. 38 9 The ISP explains that
they are not a state actor and the court agrees.390 Should private
action of such a public nature, where the ISP's mailboxes and net-
works are vital to the widespread dissemination of information,
trump the marketing firm's free speech interest? Should the pri-
vate property be open for this purpose? In general, owners of pri-
vate property are not required to allow their property to be used for
speech purposes though there are exceptions. Is there a principle
386. 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
387. See id. at 1361.
388. See Berman, supra note 380, at 1290 (calling this notion 'constitutive con-
stitutionalism': the idea that the Constitution might appropriately be viewed as
the touchstone for articulating constitutive values and for structuring public de-
bate about fundamental social and political issues).
389. Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436,438 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
390. Id. at 445.
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of free speech in this private space where property law and notions
such as trespass3 91 and nuisance predominate? Had the ISP
sought to enforce its rights through a trespass action, the issue of
free speech and state action may gain more support.3 92 However,
through self-executing code, an ISP is able to enforce its private
norms, forcing the marketing firm to bring the action to court. In
doing so, marketing firms must scramble to find an unconsciona-
bility or diversity principle/ethic in their favour since such a princi-
ple has yet to be fully developed for the digital environment. The
lack of a sophisticated notion of digital constitutionalism hinders
the making of an already difficult argument.
Secondly, imagine a private corporation that encrypts and dis-
tributes information on its own terms. UCITA contains the power
to be activated remotely or through self-help;393 thus it is self-en-
forcing with no need for the court system. Code rules. In this case,
the values or principles of the transaction are inserted and imple-
mented by the private corporation. The public values of fair use
and free access, and in a broader sense respect for the public do-
main, are not necessarily implemented in this regime. For exam-
ple, I buy a book that may not be printed or copied and may be read
or viewed only once. The code enforces this process and therefore a
court will not be brought into the question unless there is a valid
cause of action, i.e., unconsionability.
Contrast contract outside the realm of code. While I might
sign a hard copy contract containing what I consider to be the com-
plete terms of the agreement, the legislature and the courts may
still insert public interest principles, such as the notion of uncon-
scionability. Do we need legislation to ensure that these new code
driven information contracts are informationally conscionable?
Will the current law suffice?
Lessig explains much the same thing in the following way:
391. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d. 1058 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (involving a case where an Internet auction site sued an auction aggregating
site for trespass).
392. Cf Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) (holding that a company's intentional use of the service's proprietary
computer equipment was actionable trespass to chattels for which First Amend-
ment provided no defense).
393. See UCITA § 816 (1999); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence
of Self-Help, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1089 (1998).
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The dissimilarity is this: with every enforced contract-with
every agreement that subsequently calls upon an enforcer to
carry out the terms of that agreement-there is a judgment
made by the enforcer about whether this obligation should be
enforced. In the main, these judgments are made by a court.
And when a court makes such judgments, the court considers
not just the private orderings constituted in the agreement
before it, but also issues of public policy, which can, in some
contexts, override these private orderings. When a court en-
forces the agreement, it decides how far the power of the
court can be used to carry out the agreement. Sometimes the
agreement will be carried out in full; but often, the agree-
ments cannot be fully effected. Doctrines such as impossibil-
ity or mistake will discharge certain obligations. Rules about
remedy will limit the remedies the parties can seek. Public
policy exceptions will condition the kinds of agreements that
can be enforced. "Contracts" incorporate all these doctrines,
and it is the mix of this set of public values, and private obli-
gations, that together produce what we call "a contract."
When the code enforces agreements, however, or when
the code carries out a self-imposed constraint, these public
values do not necessarily enter into the mix. Consequences
that a court might resist (forfeitures, for example), the code
can impose without hesitation. The code writer operates free
of the implicit limitations of contract law. He or she can con-
struct an alternative regime for enforcing voluntary con-
straints. And nothing requires or ensures that this
alternative regime will comport with the values of the back-
ground regime we call "contract."
For again, in real space, one might well believe that a set
of obligations imposed through contract was untroubling.
Conditioned by antitrust law, limited by principles of equity,
cabined by doctrines of mistake and excuse-the obligations
would be checked by a court before the constraints were made
effective. There is a structural safety check on obligations of
this sort, which ensures that the obligations don't reach too
deep. When intervening to enforce these obligations, a court
would carry with it the collection of tools that contract law
has developed to modify, or soften, the obligations that con-
tract law might otherwise enforce.
The cyberspace analog has no equivalent toolbox. Its ob-
ligations are not conditioned by the public values that con-
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tract law embraces. Its obligations instead flow
automatically from the structures imposed in the code. These
structures serve the private ends of the code writer; they are
a private version of contract law. But as the Legal Realists
spent a generation teaching, and as we seem so keen to for-
get: contract law is public law.394
The point to make is that technology will play a significant
role in defining digital property and it is imperative that the val-
ues of such technologically constructed digital property be clearly
enunciated. These are values that will underpin the construction
of culture and knowledge, and define the framework for the crea-
tion and transfer of wealth through digitised informational
products.
CONCLUSION: THE ULTIMATE BOUNDARY? A QUESTION OF
DIGITAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
The purpose of this article has been to seek a better under-
standing and definition of digital property. As the foregoing pages
show, this is a complex process of reasoning.
At a more traditional constitutional level, the intellectual
property enumerating clauses will set limits and bring definition to
digital property. As well, free speech, where constitutionally en-
trenched, has the potential to rigorously refine digital property,
but has yet to fully achieve this outcome.
One of the most crucial points to appreciate in defining digital
property is the role of concepts of statutory or common law (non-
constitutional law). As the discussion of antitrust and fair use
principles highlights, general law will play an aggressive role in
defining the boundaries of digital property and has the potential to
infuse it with a diversity ethic designed to facilitate distributed in-
telligence and democratic society.
Next, we need to understand how contract and technology will
coalesce in the digital world to refine access and user rights-to
implement the emerging pay-per-view world/culture in which fair
use rights evaporate in the face of information user rights distrib-
uted through digital rights management systems rooted in encryp-
tion and reinforced by anti-circumventions laws. Faced with this
394. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
Harv. L. Rev. 501, 530-31 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
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emerging technology based distribution of digital property, we are
forced to ask whether "any" information at all should be open to be
freely accessed or copied? If we answer "yes," then we must advo-
cate digital rights that enhance these social attributes. This chal-
lenges us to propose principles of digital constitutionalism: on one
hand, we must question how informational power should be exer-
cised and on the other, how should value be protected? For many
of us, complete ownership will not be appreciated. A negotiated
multitudinous distributed notion of ownership is sought in which
the cultural dynamic of information must be appreciated.
In the final reckoning, the ultimate boundary of digital prop-
erty will remain a hotly contested legal concept in which many as-
pects of law and culture will be presented. The more we realise the
inherent and incredible discursive nature of information and infor-
mational products, the more we will look for diversity in the con-
struction and use of digital property, as well as the principles that
will guarantee this diversity against a backdrop of what might be
termed "digital constitutionalism."
